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ARTICLE
A CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY APPROACH TO
CAMPUS SPEECH: USING CONSTITUTIONAL
ACADEMIC FREEDOM TO HOLD THE
TENSION OF FREE SPEECH, INCLUSIVE
DIVERSITY, AND UNIVERSITY IDENTITY
SARA E. GROSS METHNER*
As the general counsel of a university,1 I have been thinking a lot
recently about speech on college and university campuses. I suspect you
have some familiarity with the current issues. In a nutshell, one group of
stakeholders argues that universities2 are according too much weight to the
interest of free speech, to the detriment of other interests they consider more
important: diversity, civility, and safety.3 Another group argues that univer-
sities are according too much weight to diversity, civility, and safety,
thereby compromising the speech freedoms these stakeholders consider
* Sara E. Gross Methner is general counsel and secretary of the University of St. Thomas
(Minnesota). She received a J.D. from Stanford Law School and a B.A. from Wellesley College.
She thanks Meredith McKnight for her able research assistance and numerous (and thus unnamed)
colleagues within the National Association of College and University Attorneys and the St.
Thomas community for their encouragement and constructive feedback as she developed this arti-
cle and the symposium presentation that preceded it.
1. It should go without saying—but since I am a lawyer, I will say it anyway—that the
views expressed in this article are my own, and not those of my employer. However, my idea that
U.S. colleges and universities can benefit from the experience of Catholic universities was in-
spired in large part by the resonance of the University of St. Thomas mission and convictions
statements and their centrality to the work of the St. Thomas community to manage tensions
between competing stakeholder interests.
2. For conciseness, I use “university” throughout this article to refer to all nonprofit higher
education organizations that are generally understood to be part of academia. I set aside for-profit
organizations because their pursuit of profit is inconsistent with academia’s institutional obligation
to serve the common good, in the public trust, which I interpret to be consistent with public or
charitable, but not with for-profit, identity. See infra notes 94–99 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, Lukewarm Embrace of Free Speech, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC.
(Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/10/11/students-opinions-free-speech-
divided; Ana Mari Cauce, Messy But Essential, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 20, 2017), https://
www.insidehighered.com/views/2017/11/20/why-we-need-protect-free-speech-campuses-essay.
358
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more important.4 University administrators are in the middle, trying to man-
age the tension and persuade stakeholders that whatever approach the uni-
versity has chosen is the appropriate one.5 Everyone feels—as
demonstrated in Charlottesville and elsewhere6—that the stakes are high.7
Tensions around campus speech are not new;8 however, recent ten-
sions arise in an environment that is more complex than ever.9 Society and
universities have become more pluralistic;10 communities are increasingly
4. See, e.g., Jamie Piltch, Free Speech Isn’t Under Attack on Campuses, WASH. POST (Dec.
7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2017/12/07/free-speech-
isnt-under-attack-on-campuses; Chris Quintana, Colleges Are Creating ‘A Generation of Sancti-
monious, Sensitive, Supercilious Snowflakes,’ Sessions Says, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 24,
2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Colleges-Are-Creating-a/243997; Jeff Sessions, U.S. At-
torney Gen., Address on the Importance of Free Speech on College Campuses at Georgetown Law
(Sept. 26, 2017).
5. See, e.g., Cauce, supra note 3; Scott Jaschik, Presidents and Provosts Gather to Consider
Free Speech Issues, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/
2017/10/16/college-presidents-and-provosts-gather-consider-issues-free-speech; Christina Paxson,
Opinion, Brown President: A Safe Space for Free Expression, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2016), https:/
/www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/brown-university-president-safe-spaces-dont-threaten-free
dom-of-expression-they-protect-it/2016/09/05/6201870e-736a-11e6-8149-b8d05321db62_story.
html; AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC., To the Point: Campus Inclusion and Freedom of Expression:
Hateful Incidents on Campus (2018), https://www.acenet.edu/news-room/Documents/To-The-
Point-Hateful-Incidents.pdf [hereinafter Hateful Incidents on Campus].
6. See, e.g., Joe Heim, Recounting a Day of Rage, Hate, Violence and Death: How a Rally
of White Nationalists and Supremacists at the University of Virginia Turned into a “tragic, tragic
weekend,” WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/local/
charlottesville-timeline; Richard Cohen, Opinion, Protestors at Middlebury College Demonstrate
‘Cultural Appropriation’ – of Fascism, WASH. POST (May 29, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/opinions/protesters-at-middlebury-college-demonstrate-cultural-appropriation—of-fas
cism/2017/05/29/af2a3548-4241-11e7-9869-bac8b446820a_story.html.
7. See, e.g., Nicholas B. Dirks, The Real Issue in the Campus Speech Debate: The Univer-
sity Is Under Assault, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-
point/wp/2017/08/09/the-real-issue-in-the-campus-speech-debate-the-university-is-under-assault;
Mark G. Yudof & Kenneth Waltzer, Free Speech, Campus Safety, or Both, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.
(Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Free-Speech-Campus-Safety-or/241220;
Andy Thomason & Steven Johnson, UNC Chancellor Steps Down and Orders the Removal of
Silent Sam’s Remains, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.chronicle.com/article/
UNC-Chancellor-Steps-Down-and/245472.
8. See Ronald J. Rychlak, Civil Rights, Confederate Flags, and Political Correctness: Free
Speech and Race Relations on Campus, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1411 (1992); Natalie Shutler, Opinion,
The Free Speech-Hate Speech Trade-Off, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/09/13/opinion/berkeley-dean-erwin-chemerinsky.html; ASS’N OF GOVERNING BOARDS,
FREEDOM OF SPEECH ON CAMPUS: GUIDELINES FOR GOVERNING BOARDS AND INSTITUTIONAL
LEADERS 3 (2017), https://www.agb.org/sites/default/files/u27335/report_2017_free_speech.pdf
[hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR GOVERNING BOARDS].
9. See, e.g., ASS’N OF AM. C. & U., COLLEGE LEARNING FOR THE NEW GLOBAL CENTURY:
A REPORT FROM THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP COUNCIL FOR LIBERAL EDUCATION & AMERICA’S
PROMISE (2007), https://www.acu.org/sites/default/files/files/LEAP/GlobalCentury_final.pdf.
10. See, e.g., ASPEN INST., PRINCIPLED PLURALISM: REPORT OF THE INCLUSIVE AMERICA PRO-
JECT (2013), https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/docs/pubs/Principled-
Pluralism_0.pdf.
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polarized;11 costs of education have risen dramatically12 while universities
work to increase access;13 our understanding of health and well-being has
expanded beyond the physical;14 social media and online speech dominate
our discourse; and traditional boundaries between public, private, and pro-
fessional are blurring.15 The differences in higher education now versus
fifty, or a hundred years ago are striking. Whether the law has kept appro-
priate pace with these changes in its approach to speech is an unresolved
question.16 It seems to me we should also be asking whether universities’
approach to speech has kept appropriate pace: Does their current approach
effectively serve the interests of universities, their students, and the public,
given the realities of the twenty-first century?
My answer to both questions is no. In this article, I assert that the
interrelated values of diversity, civility, and safety—which I refer to collec-
tively as inclusive diversity—are as critical as speech to the distinctive in-
11. See, e.g., The Big Sort, ECONOMIST (June 19, 2008), http://www.economist.com/node/
11581447.
12. See, e.g., Briana Boyington, See 20 Years of Tuition Growth at National Universities,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/
paying-for-college/articles/2017-09-20/See-20-years-of-tuition-growth-at-national-universities;
John W. Schoen, Why Does a College Degree Cost So Much?, CNBC (June 16, 2015, 10:22 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2015/06/16/why-college-costs-are-so-high-and-rising.html.
13. See, e.g., David Leonhardt, Opinion, The Assault on Colleges—and The American
Dream, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/25/opinion/sunday/the-
assault-on-colleges-and-the-american-dream.html; Top Colleges Doing the Most for the American
Dream, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/05/25/sunday-re
view/opinion-pell-table.html.
14. See, e.g., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, WELL-BEING CONCEPTS (2016),
https://www.cdc.gov/hrqol/wellbeing.htm; Arielle Eiser, The Crisis on Campus, 42 AM. PSYCHOL.
ASS’N. 18 (2011), http://www.apa.org/monitor/2011/09/crisis-campus.aspx.
15. See Scholarly Activities and Reputation in the Digital Age: A Conceptual Framework,
CIBER, at 2 (Nov. 2016), http://ciber-research.eu/download/20161116-Reputation_WP1_Scholar
ly_Activities.pdf  [hereinafter Digital Age]; Janet Eyler, The Power of Experiential Education, 95
LIBERAL EDUC. 4 (2009), https://www.aacu.org/publications-research/periodicals/power-experien
tial-education; Molly McCluskey, Public Universities Get an Education in Private Industry, THE
ATLANTIC (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/04/public-universi
ties-get-an-education-in-private-industry/521379/; Babson Study: Distance Education Enrollment
Growth Continues, ONLINE LEARNING CONSORTIUM (Feb. 9, 2016), https://onlinelearningconsorti
um.org/news_item/babson-study-distance-education-enrollment-growth-continues-2/; Barbara
Kieslinger, Academic Peer Pressure in Social Media: Experiences from the Heavy, the Targeted




user.pdf; Hamid R. Jamali, David Nicholas, & Eti Herman, Scholarly Reputation in the Digital
Age and the Role of Emerging Platforms and Mechanisms, 25 RES. EVALUATION 37, 37 (2016).
16. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Four Ironies of Campus Climate, 101 MINN. L.
REV. 1919 (2017); Erica Goldberg, Free Speech Consequentialism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 687
(2016); Alexander Tsesis, Balancing Free Speech, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2016) [hereinafter Balanc-
ing Free Speech]; Alexander Tsesis, Dignity and Speech: The Regulation of Hate Speech in a
Democracy, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497 (2009); Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation:
The Visibility of Hate, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1596 (2010).
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stitutional identity and mission of universities. I argue that campus speech
tensions have been exacerbated by universities’ failure to clearly articulate
the essential nature of both interests to university identity and mission, and
to publicly explain and assert the institutional autonomy that is necessary to
manage the tension between them.
These failures have led stakeholders to expect that universities will
apply the same balancing approach to manage speech tensions as the U.S.
Supreme Court applies outside academia—an approach that usually results
in an imbalanced outcome that favors one competing interest over the other.
In practice, however, many universities appear to take a different approach:
trying to achieve an even balance of competing interests, by compromising
some aspects of each. The Court has demonstrated a willingness to facilitate
this balance by granting substantial deference to university judgments in the
realm of speech, but it has not articulated its decision-making framework or
rationale in a way that universities, their stakeholders, or lower courts fully
comprehend.17 The lack of clarity about the proper scope of universities’
autonomy when managing speech tensions has contributed to stakeholder
confusion, concerns about institutional integrity, and declines in public trust
in universities.18
I propose a new approach to campus speech that would better serve
universities, their stakeholders, and constitutional interests, with greater
transparency, accountability, and integrity. My approach is based on lessons
gleaned from the experience of Catholic universities. Over the past fifty
years, Catholic universities and their stakeholders have engaged in deliber-
ate, communal efforts to manage the tension between the essential academic
17. See Erica Goldberg & Kelly Sarabyn, Measuring a Degree of Deference: Institutional
Academic Freedom in a Post-Grutter World, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 217, 219 (2011); Paul
Horwitz, Grutter’s First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461, 469 (2005) [hereinafter Grutter’s First
Amendment]; David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of “Individual” and “Institutional” Aca-
demic Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227, 235–37 (1990);
Larry D. Spurgeon, The Endangered Citizen Servant: Garcetti Versus the Public Interest and
Academic Freedom, 39 J.C. & U.L. 405, 408, 459 (2013) [hereinafter Citizen Servant].
18. Confusion about the appropriate management of campus speech tensions is not the only
reason for decreasing public trust in academia, but it clearly contributes to public concerns about
the purpose and value of a university education. See Anna Brown, Most Americans Say Higher Ed
Is Heading in the Wrong Direction, but Partisans Disagree on Why, PEW RES. CTR.: FACT TANK
(July 26, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/07/26/most-americans-say-higher-ed-
is-heading-in-wrong-direction-but-partisans-disagree-on-why/; PUBLIC, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC.,
2018 SURVEY OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY PRESIDENTS: A STUDY BY INSIDER HIGHER ED AND
GALLUP, 6, 23 (Scott Jaschik & Doug Lederman, eds., 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/sys
tem/files/media/2018_Presidents_Survey_Final.pdf [hereinafter 2018 GALLUP SURVEY] (noting
decreasing American support for higher education, and discussing the extent to which university
presidents believe campus racial protests and perceptions of liberal political bias contribute to this
decline); Colleen Flaherty, ‘Regaining Public Trust,’ INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 27, 2017), https:/
/www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/01/27/academics-consider-how-rebuild-public-trust-higher-
education; Scott Jaschik, Why Republicans Don’t Trust Higher Education, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC.
(Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/08/17/new-data-explain-republican-
loss-confidence-higher-education.
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norms that underlie Catholic universities’ identity as universities, and the
essential ecclesiological norms that underlie their identities as Catholic.
Rather than accepting an imbalanced outcome, Catholic universities ac-
knowledged that Catholic and university were equally essential to their dis-
tinctive mission and identity. They committed to embrace and synthesize
these competing interests by renewing their vision for the modern Catholic
university—a unified institution that is both part of and distinguished from
other universities and the Church. Their work, while imperfect, provides a
useful model for all universities as they struggle with campus speech ten-
sions and public ambiguity about university purpose and value.
My proposal requires an understanding of the differing applications of
free speech principles within and outside academia, which, in my observa-
tion, are often only murkily understood by university stakeholders.19 Part I
provides context to help understand these distinctions. Part II describes in
greater detail universities’ current approach to managing campus speech
tensions, its shortcomings, and the need for a new approach. Part III pro-
vides context to help understand the Catholic university experience. Part IV
addresses the constitutionality of my proposal; it seeks to clarify the Court’s
decision-making framework, rationale, and the proper scope of deference to
universities in the face of competing constitutional interests. Part V details
my proposed approach, applying lessons from the Catholic university
experience.
I. FREE SPEECH AND THE UNIVERSITY MARKETPLACE
A. First Amendment Freedom of Speech
Freedom of speech is guaranteed under the First Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution, which states that “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”20 However, this guarantee is not
absolute; the Constitution only restricts or requires action by state actors.
Moreover, the First Amendment provides no real guidance about what free-
dom of speech means and how it applies in practice. We rely on the Court
to tell us.21 It recognizes that completely unfettered speech would prevent
the smooth functioning of society and is not entirely consistent with consti-
tutional values.22 Consequently, it interprets the Constitution to permit
speech restrictions in limited circumstances.23 It generally identifies these
19. See also Robert Post, Discipline and Freedom in the Academy, 65 ARK. L. REV. 203, 205
(2012) [hereinafter Discipline and Freedom].
20. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
21. See ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 5–6 (2012) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY, EX-
PERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM].
22. There is no single accepted theory to explain the Court’s First Amendment decisions. See
id.
23. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 288–89, 292 (2008).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\15-2\UST204.txt unknown Seq: 6  8-APR-19 13:09
2019] FREE SPEECH, INCLUSIVE DIVERSITY, AND UNIVERSITY IDENTITY 363
circumstances by applying a balancing construct that weighs the value of
unfettered speech against the competing interests the government seeks to
preserve and manage by regulating speech, assessing whether the compet-
ing interests are sufficiently compelling to justify the regulation.24
Of course, this is a metaphorical balancing process; it is not conducted
using calibrated scales that assign weight to competing interests using ob-
jective measures like ounces and pounds. Rather, it involves subjective val-
uations of competing interests.25 To be sure, these valuations are guided by
the Court’s norms (to the extent individual Justices determine they are com-
pelled to follow them).26 Ultimately, however, the balancing outcome de-
pends on each decision maker’s understanding of those norms, and on
decision makers’ understanding of their role in the balancing process—for
example, whether they view it as their role to defer to existing norms or to
facilitate the evolution and recognition of new ones.27
The term “balancing” suggests that the purpose of the balancing pro-
cess is to maintain equal weight on both sides of the scale. Thus, in most
situations, when a decision maker seeks to balance competing interests sup-
ported by different groups of stakeholders, there is an expectation of com-
promise, in which each side will give something up such that at the end of
the process, both sides will be evenly positioned. But this is not the Court’s
approach to balancing under the First Amendment. Its balancing process
almost always results in an imbalance in which one interest or set of inter-
ests is accorded more weight than another, and the heavier side of the scale
wins.28
An imbalanced outcome in a First Amendment case is unlikely to sur-
prise anyone. In fact, each side generally hopes for an imbalanced outcome.
Speech cases involve highly valued interests, and each set of stakeholders
wants to win. The public’s expectation is that the winner almost always
should be speech.29 In practice, of course, the outcomes are mixed;30 the
24. See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119–20 (2003); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 759 (1982); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Matthew W. Finkin, Intra-
mural Speech, Academic Freedom, and the First Amendment, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1323, 1329–32
(1988) [hereinafter Intramural Speech]. See generally Kathleen Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging:
The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 308–09 (1992) [hereinafter
Post-Liberal Judging].
25. See Stanley Fish, Fraught with Death: Skepticism, Progressivism, and the First Amend-
ment, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1061, 1074–75 (1993) [hereinafter Fraught]; Post-Liberal Judging,
supra note 24, at 294, 301; Goldberg, supra note 16, at 688; Grutter’s First Amendment, supra
note 17, at 574.
26. See Brian Leiter, Constitutional Law, Moral Judgment, and the Supreme Court as Super-
Legislature, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1601 (2015).
27. See Fraught, supra note 25, at 1085–86; Grutter’s First Amendment, supra note 17, at
574.
28. See Post-Liberal Judging, supra note 24, at 293–97, 309.
29. See Balancing Free Speech, supra note 16, at 2; DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACA-
DEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 21, at x–xi.
30. See generally Post-Liberal Judging, supra note 24.
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cases that rise to the Court generally involve circumstances where the con-
stitutional value of competing interests is unclear. But as a general rule, the
Court balances in favor of interests other than speech only if favoring
speech would materially up-end deeply held and widespread community
norms31—assuming, of course, that these norms do not themselves violate
the Court’s understanding of constitutional guarantees.32
The Court has recognized a number of competing societal interests that
always trump free speech rights,33 and state actors are free to regulate
speech to preserve these interests. Each of these interests shares the com-
mon goal of avoiding the heightened risk of personal harm or social or
economic disruption that is inherent in these categories of speech.34 Beyond
these categorical interests, unless otherwise bound by precedent, the Court
has generally sought to make its balancing decisions more predictable by
utilizing forum analysis.
31. Examples include: the expectation that minors should not be portrayed in or able to easily
access obscene materials, see, e.g., United States v. Williams, 535 U.S. 285 (2008); Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 37 (1973); that we should not be disturbed by loud and raucous noise at
times and places we ordinarily expect tranquility, see, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781 (1989); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); and that organizations should be able to
carry out their work without substantial disruption, see, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). These decisions are consistent with Robert Post’s insight that
“[a]s a sociological formation, community [a social order ‘in which persons are connected to each
other through common socialization in mutual social norms’] is more fundamental than democ-
racy.” Robert Post, Participatory Democracy as a Theory of Free Speech: A Reply, 97 VA. L.
REV. 617, 624 (2011) [hereinafter Participatory Democracy]. See also Grutter’s First Amendment,
supra note 17, at 523.
32. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I think
that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we
loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interfer-
ence with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save
the country.”); Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821,
866–67 (2008) [hereinafter Institutions in the Marketplace]. See generally Fraught, supra note 25;
Balancing Free Speech, supra note 16, at 21, 32–34; Grutter’s First Amendment, supra note 17, at
574, 578.
33. While these “categorical” exceptions to protected speech generally are distinguished
from the Court’s balancing approach to speech, in reality, balancing was still employed; it just
occurred in the first instance of establishing the category. The distinction is one of categorical
versus ad hoc balancing. See Balancing Free Speech, supra note 16, at 6, 34–35; Post-Liberal
Judging, supra note 24, at 293, 308–09.
34. See Balancing Free Speech, supra note 16, at 3–4. These categorical interests include:
avoiding violence and threats of violence, see Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003); Samuels v.
Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 75 (1971); preventing material disruption or “substantial disorder or inva-
sion of the rights of others” in an educational setting, Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513, or workplace, see
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); preventing
libel and defamation, see Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990); Gertz v. Robert
Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); prohibiting certain kinds of obscene materials, see Williams, 535
U.S. at 285; Miller, 413 U.S. at 37; and avoiding false and misleading commercial speech, see
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). State actors also are free
to regulate employee speech to some degree. The proper scope of such regulation by public uni-
versities has raised constitutional questions because the Court historically has treated universities
differently than other participants in the marketplace of ideas, as further described in this article.
See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425, 438 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Forum analysis grants more or less weight to the government’s interest
in regulating speech depending on the customary usage of the forum in
which the speech occurs.35 In public forums (such as public sidewalks)
where speech traditionally has been unlimited, the courts accord little
weight to competing government interests. In nonpublic forums that are
never or rarely open to the public (such as the private offices of government
officials), competing government interests are accorded more weight.36 In
forums that traditionally or by designation have a mixed purpose (such as
auditoriums or meeting rooms made available for both private and public
use), the courts permit the government to subject speech to reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions; however, any restrictions must be content-
neutral and narrowly tailored, while also serving a compelling government
interest and preserving “ample alternative channels for communication of
the information.”37 In limited public forums, the courts permit more exten-
sive restrictions, allowing the reservation of the forum “for certain groups
or for the discussion of certain topics” so long as restrictions on speech are
applied without consideration of the speaker’s viewpoint.38 The govern-
ment’s ability to regulate a forum it opens for public speech depends on
35. See generally John D. Inazu, The First Amendment’s Public Forum, 56 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1169 (2014–15); Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and
Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987) [hereinafter Governance and Man-
agement]. Both Inazu and Post argue that public forum doctrine is not coherent. It seems likely to
decrease in coherence as courts apply this doctrine to property that is decreasingly like a tradi-
tional, physical venue for speech. An example is the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Gerlich v. Leath,
in which the court held that a university’s decision to permit students to use the university’s
trademarks, subject to certain policy conditions, had created a limited public forum. 861 F.3d 697
(8th Cir. 2017). The court relied on prior cases that applied forum analysis beyond traditional
physical spaces to include state resources and programs, generally including the application of
university-collected student activity fees, a school mail system, and a federal employee charitable
contribution program. See id. at 705 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 823–27, 829–30 (1995), Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S.
37, 46–47 (1983), and Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 801
(1985)). Post’s claim that “in the past two decades . . . the Court seems to have lost track of why
the First Amendment protects speech,” particularly resonates in light of the holding of Gerlich:
students’ use of a university trademark does not expand or improve the opportunity for public
discourse or otherwise advance the pursuit of truth or knowledge; what value can there be in
allowing a student organization to tie its speech to a university’s trademarks, aside from providing
some kind of university imprimatur for that speech? Robert Post, The Classic First Amendment
Tradition Under Stress: Freedom of Speech and the University, YALE L. SCH. 7 (Sept. 28, 2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3044434 (last updated Feb. 11, 2018) [hereinafter Freedom of Speech
and the University]; see also Post-Liberal Judging, supra note 24, at 315.
36. See Inazu, supra note 35, at 1175–77.
37. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); see also Perry
Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 44 (“The existence of a right of access to public property and the stan-
dard by which limitations upon such a right must be evaluated differ depending on the character of
the property at issue.”); Ward, 491 U.S. at 781; Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115
(1972).
38. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\15-2\UST204.txt unknown Seq: 9  8-APR-19 13:09
366 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:2
how clearly it has articulated, and how consistently it has enforced, the
forum’s intended purpose.39
When the Court balances in favor of interests that compete with unfet-
tered speech, it generally draws the boundaries around permitted restric-
tions as narrowly as practicable to avoid the socially disruptive
consequences.40 Additionally, it seeks to ensure any restriction is suffi-
ciently clear to avoid ambiguity about whether it impermissibly “regulates a
substantial amount of protected speech.”41
B. Competing for Truth in the Marketplace of Ideas
Since 1919, the First Amendment’s free speech protections have fre-
quently been explained using Justice Holmes’ “marketplace of ideas” meta-
phor, equating public discourse to a competitive marketplace in which
market acceptance is the “best test” of truth.42 Courts, commentators, and
university stakeholders regularly invoke this metaphor to justify the protec-
tion of speech within academia,43 even outside the First Amendment con-
text, in recognition of the truth-seeking mission that traditionally has guided
universities.44
The marketplace metaphor reflects the antitrust principle45 that a diver-
sity of products and offerors will ensure an efficient market in which mar-
39. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (“The government does not create a public forum by
inaction or by permitting limited disclosure, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional
forum for public discourse. Accordingly, the Court has looked to the policy and practice of the
government to ascertain whether it intended to designate a place not traditionally open to assem-
bly and debate to a public forum.” (citations omitted)); Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46–47;
Governance and Management, supra note 35, at 1756.
40. See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45; United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292–93
(2008).
41. Williams, 553 U.S. at 304. At the same time, the Court recognizes that “perfect clarity
and precise guidance have never been required even of regulations that restrict expressive activ-
ity.” Id. (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 794).
42. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (asserting
that “the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market”). See also Healy
v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972); Rabban, supra note 17, at 233. The marketplace metaphor has
shown remarkable resonance given that truth-seeking is not conclusively understood to be the sole
purpose or value served by the First Amendment. See generally Balancing Free Speech, supra
note 16; Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (2004);
Participatory Democracy, supra note 31; Freedom of Speech and the University, supra note 35.
43. See Institutions in the Marketplace, supra note 32, at 831; R. George Wright, The Emer-
gence of First Amendment Academic Freedom, 85 NEB. L. REV. 793, 807 (2007) [hereinafter
Emergence]; Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Healy, 408 U.S. at 180, 197;
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995).
44. See William J. Hoye, The Religious Roots of Academic Freedom, 58 THEO. STUD. 409,
415–22 (1997); Intramural Speech, supra note 24, at 1323–24; J. Peter Byrne, Academic Free-
dom: A “Special Concern of the First Amendment,” 99 YALE L.J. 251, 267–69 nn.57–59 (1989)
[hereinafter Special Concern]; Emergence, supra note 43, at 809–10.
45. See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Is Competition Always Good?, 1 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCE-
MENT 162 (2013).
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ket acceptance reveals product value.46 The Court’s limited regulation of
the marketplace of ideas is consistent with this principle47: Anyone can join
the marketplace, for any purpose that serves their fancy. With the exception
of the few categories of speech restricted by the Court based on their inher-
ent, heightened risk of harm or disruption,48 participants can share whatever
ideas they desire and can assess others’ ideas based on whatever factors
serve their personal interests.
But ensuring a diversity of offerors and products, without more, does
not demonstrate any particular product’s worth; market participants must
assess the product for validity and value.49 In a competitive commercial
marketplace, market acceptance, validity, and value are generally aligned:
simply count the number of products sold and ask whether the product did
what consumers expected. Offerors whose products are proven not to work
or are generally perceived to be of low worth must adapt their offerings, or
lower their cost, to gain widespread market acceptance.
Not so in a competitive marketplace of ideas, where experience dem-
onstrates that market acceptance does not always reflect an idea’s validity
or value50: The market sometimes rejects ideas simply because they are
unconventional, complex, or can only be proven theoretically, even if sup-
ported by observable facts.51 The market may dismiss ideas because they do
not serve consumers’ immediate or direct interests,52 even when the ideas
are well-grounded by rigorous, expert research.53 Idea assessment poses
unique challenges that do not exist in a commercial marketplace: How can
individual market participants accurately determine the validity of ideas
generated in pursuit of an unknown truth?54 What compels the market to
value ideas that individual market participants cannot personally test and
prove? With plentiful, inexpensive, public-speech platforms that allow for
anonymity or reward participants for the attention they receive, regardless
of whether any evidence grounds the ideas they share, there are few incen-
46. See also Balancing Free Speech, supra note 16, at 2.
47. See Emergence, supra note 43, at 809; see also supra Part I.A.
48. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
49. See DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 21, at 6–8.
50. See Institutions in the Marketplace, supra note 32, at 832–33; Frederick Schauer, Free
Speech, the Search for Truth, and the Problem of Collective Knowledge, 70 SMU L. REV. 231,
237–38 (2017) [hereinafter Search for Truth].
51. Galileo’s theory of heliocentrism is a well-known example of an idea now widely ac-
cepted as objectively true and beneficial that initially was rejected by the marketplace of ideas.
See Hoye, supra note 44, at 412.
52. See Rabban, supra note 17, at 233; AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1915 DECLARA-
TION OF PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND ACADEMIC TENURE, [hereinafter 1915 DECLARA-
TION] reprinted in POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 167, 167–68 (11th ed. 2014) [hereinafter
REDBOOK].
53. See, e.g., UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, GLOBAL WARMING SKEPTIC ORGANIZA-
TIONS, https://www.ucsusa.org/global-warming/solutions/fight-misinformation/global-warming-
skeptic.html.
54. See Search for Truth, supra note 50, at 232–38.
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tives to withdraw or adapt attention-getting ideas that a large segment of the
market, or even the offeror, knows or suspects to be flawed. The reality is,
in the marketplace of ideas, market acceptance does not demonstrate valid-
ity or truth; it only demonstrates market acceptance.
Universities recognized many of these idea-assessment challenges long
before Justice Holmes coined his metaphor.55 Today’s universities evolved
from medieval communities of scholars who pursued truth for its own sake;
they eventually formalized this pursuit, and the transmission of identified
truths as knowledge, through the organized structure of universities.56 Uni-
versity communities have long understood that without common standards
of idea assessment, they cannot readily identify which ideas best reflect
truth and thus deserve attention, promotion, and inclusion in the compendia
of knowledge.57 They resolved these challenges by adopting a system of
self-regulation that applies common standards of idea assessment across
academia.58 This system distinguishes the university marketplace (my
shorthand description for the subset of ideas generated or shared by or
within university communities) from the public marketplace (my shorthand
description for the broader marketplace of ideas that is generally open to
anyone),59 where there are no common standards of idea assessment.60 As a
result of academia’s self-regulation, Justice Holmes’ metaphor, which does
not bear out in the public marketplace, works perfectly within the university
marketplace, where market acceptance is the best test of truth.
C. The University Marketplace: Regulating Speech to Serve the
Common Good
1. Academic Freedom: Assuring Academic Identity and Quality
The terms “academia,” “academe,” and “the academy,” commonly
used to describe universities and scholars as a group, reflect their collective
status as an institution: organizations and individuals who share a publicly
recognized, common purpose and hold themselves accountable to shared
55. See generally Hoye, supra note 44.
56. See id. at 415–22; Intramural Speech, supra note 24, at 1324; Special Concern, supra
note 44; Emergence, supra note 43, at 809–10.
57. See DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 21, at 6–7.
58. See PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS at 265 (2013) [hereinafter FIRST
AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS] ; Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some
Easy Answers and Hard Questions, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1513–15 (2007) [hereinafter Easy
Answers]; ASS’N OF AM. C. & U., Academic Freedom and Educational Responsibility 1, 4–7
(2006), https://www.aacu.org/sites/default/files/files/about/academicFreedom.pdf [hereinafter
AACU Statement on Educational Responsibility].
59. My definition of “public marketplace” is derived from Robert Post’s term “public dis-
course,” which he uses to describe “the communicative acts deemed necessary for the free forma-
tion of public opinion.” Discipline and Freedom, supra note 19, at 207; see also Freedom of
Speech and the University, supra note 35, at 5.
60. See DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 21, at 6–10; Freedom
of Speech and the University, supra note 35, at 13–22.
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norms that distinguish them from society generally.61 The shared norms of
academia are designed to ensure that contributions to the university market-
place are subjected to rigorous professional standards and extensive compe-
tition from other participants within relevant disciplines, whose own
contributions to the university marketplace have been demonstrated to have
validity and value using the same standards of assessment.62 This system of
self-regulation is intended to facilitate continuous truth-seeking and knowl-
edge expansion in a virtuous, accelerating cycle of learning and discov-
ery.63 If the system is working properly, only contributions meeting these
shared standards of quality assurance will survive, rise, and be transmitted
to students and the public marketplace,64 while contributions failing to meet
these standards will be rejected and buried.65
By holding themselves accountable to academia’s common assessment
process and standards, individual universities and scholars are marked as
reputable members of academia.66 Their reputations are further influenced
by the extent to which they produce ideas that garner both market attention
and acceptance.67 To increase their odds, universities carefully select the
scholars they invite to join their individual university communities, requir-
ing prospective scholars to demonstrate a minimum level of expertise, dili-
gence, and originality in the generation of ideas within the university’s
particular areas of educational focus, and preferring scholars who demon-
strate a high level of originality and promise in these areas.68
61. See Institutions in the Marketplace, supra note 32, at 840, 842; FIRST AMENDMENT INSTI-
TUTIONS, supra note 58, at 47–48, 81, 86; Peter J. Byrne, Constitutional Academic Freedom After
Grutter: Getting Real about the “Four Freedoms” of a University, 77 UNIV. COLO. L. REV.
929–53 (2006) [hereinafter Getting Real]; Grutter’s First Amendment, supra note 17, at 571–72.
62. See DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 21, at 7–9; AACU
Statement on Educational Responsibility, supra note 58, at 3.
63. See J. Peter Byrne, The Threat to Constitutional Academic Freedom, J.C. & U.L. 79, 139
(2004) [hereinafter Threat]; DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 21, at
6, 63–64; Search for Truth, supra note 50, at 239–40.
64. See DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 21, at xi–xii, 64–65.
65. See Institutions in the Marketplace, supra note 32, at 821, 824, 838; Special Concern,
supra note 44, at 286; R.H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 27 (1977);
Discipline and Freedom, supra note 19, at 205, 209–10. See also 1915 DECLARATION, supra note
52, at 207 (“Not less is it a distinguishable duty of the university to be the conservator of all
genuine elements of value in the past thought and life of mankind which are not in the fashion of
the moment. Though it need not be the ‘home of beaten causes,’ the university is, indeed, likely
always to exercise a certain form of conservative influence. For by its nature it is committed to the
principle that knowledge should proceed action . . . .” (emphasis added)).
66. See Michael W. McConnell, Academic Freedom in Religious Colleges and Universities,
53 J.L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 303, 309–10 & n.18 (1990).
67. See Jamali, Nicholas, & Herman, supra note 15 (discussing the evolving ways in which
scholars build their reputations in a digital world); Digital Age, supra note 15, at 2 (asserting that
digital developments and a broader interpretation of academia’s purpose “both call for and enable
taking a much more wide-ranging, inclusive and representative view of reputation-building schol-
arly achievement.”).
68. See, e.g., Alexander C. Kafka, Another Sign of a Tough Job Market: Grad Students Feel
Bigger Push to Publish, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (May 30, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/arti
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Recognizing the institutional importance of a robust and flourishing
university marketplace, and the inherent challenges of idea assessment,
once a university accepts a faculty scholar into its community, the univer-
sity guarantees the faculty member’s freedom to offer, test, and promote
ideas without interference or censure by the university,69 so long as the
faculty member maintains integrity with standards of conduct that are in
accordance with recognized academic norms.70 This guarantee is known as
academic freedom, the most fundamental norm of academia.71
Academic freedom is a kind of free speech guarantee, but it is more
constrained than First Amendment freedom of speech;72 it only protects
speech that is necessary for faculty to fulfill their professional obligations as
scholars and teachers.73 Specifically, it safeguards freedom in research and
publication in the classroom when discussing the subject of the class and
when speaking or writing as citizens.74 These freedoms are conditional, re-
quiring faculty to uphold related professional responsibilities: freedom in
research is conditioned on “adequate performance of other academic du-
ties”; freedom in the classroom does not extend to “controversial matter that
has no relation to their subject”; and when speaking and writing as citizens,
cle/Another-Sign-of-a-Tough-Job/243536; Maggie Kuo, Hoping for a Faculty Job? Here’s What
Hiring Committees Are Looking For, SCIENCE (Oct. 2, 2017, 3:40 PM), http://www.sciencemag
.org/careers/2017/10/hoping-faculty-job-heres-what-hiring-committees-are-looking; Joel Warner
& Aaron Clauset, The Academy’s Dirty Secret, SLATE (Feb. 23, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.slate
.com/articles/life/education/2015/02/university_hiring_if_you_didn_t_get_your_ph_d_at_an_elite
_university_good.html; Audrey Williams June, How One College Reinvented Its Hiring Process
to Better Test for ‘Fit,’ CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., (July 6, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/
How-One-College-Reinvented-Its/243866.
69. See Rabban, supra note 17, at 284; William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and the
First Amendment in the Supreme Court of the United States: An Unhurried Historical Review, 53
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 87 (1990).
70. See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1940 STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC
FREEDOM AND TENURE WITH 1970 INTERPRETIVE COMMENTS, reprinted in REDBOOK, supra note
52 [hereinafter 1940 STATEMENT]; AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, STATEMENT ON RECRUIT-
MENT AND RESIGNATION OF FACULTY MEMBERS, reprinted in REDBOOK, supra note 52; Intramural
Speech, supra note 24, at 1333–35; Discipline and Freedom, supra note 19, at 205; Rabban, supra
note 17, at 241–43, 255.
71. See Van Alstyne, supra note 69, at 87. The definitive standard of academic freedom for
U.S. universities is set forth in 1940 STATEMENT, supra note 70, at 13–15. All other recognized,
professional norms of academia derive from and support academic freedom. See AM. ASS’N OF
UNIV. PROFESSORS, AAUP REPORT: ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF FACULTY GOVERNANCE TO ACA-
DEMIC FREEDOM, reprinted in REDBOOK, supra note 52 [hereinafter FACULTY GOVERNANCE] ; Spe-
cial Concern, supra note 44, at 267, 318–20; Intramural Speech, supra note 24, at 1339; Larry G.
Gerber, “Inextricably Linked”: Shared Governance and Academic Freedom, 87 ACADEME 22, 23
(2001); Rabban, supra note 17, at 297–98.
72. See Emergence, supra note 43, at 7; AACU Statement on Educational Responsibility,
supra note 58, at 3.
73. See 1940 STATEMENT, supra note 70, at 14; ACADEMIC FREEDOM OF STUDENTS AND
PROFESSORS, AND POLITICAL DISCRIMINATION, AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, https://
www.aaup.org/academic-freedom-students-and-professors-and-political-discrimination (last vis-
ited Sept. 18, 2018) [hereinafter ACADEMIC FREEDOM OF STUDENTS AND PROFESSORS].
74. See 1940 STATEMENT, supra note 70, at 14.
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faculty members’ “special position in the community imposes special
obligations”:
As scholars and educational officers, they should remember that
the public may judge their profession and their institution by their
utterances. Hence they should at all times be accurate, should ex-
ercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions
of others, and should make every effort to indicate that they are
not speaking for the institution.75
Non-faculty personnel of a university may be published experts in
their fields and officers of the university, but they are not entitled to aca-
demic freedom,76 nor are they subject to its conditions.77 There also is no
clear, common expectation or definition of academic freedom for students,
though there is broad recognition that students have a right to pursue and
promote ideas in ways that enable them to learn what the university seeks to
teach.78
75. Id. The 1940 Statement is supplemented by 1970 Interpretive Comments, which provide
additional guidance regarding the appropriate consequences for faculty who fail to comply with
the standards governing this “extramural” speech:
The controlling principle is that a faculty member’s expression of opinion as a citizen
cannot constitute grounds for dismissal unless it clearly demonstrates the faculty mem-
ber’s unfitness to serve. Extramural utterances rarely bear upon the faculty member’s
fitness for continuing service. Moreover, a final decision should take into account the
faculty member’s entire record as a teacher and scholar.
1940 STATEMENT, supra note 70, at 15 (quoting AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, COMMITTEE A
STATEMENT ON EXTRAMURAL UTTERANCES, reprinted in REDBOOK, supra note 52, at 31 [hereinaf-
ter EXTRAMURAL UTTERANCES] ). See also Rabban, supra note 17, at 234.
76. See Intramural Speech, supra note 24, at 1332–33, 1338–39; Mark G. Yudof, Intramural
Musings on Academic Freedom: A Reply to Professor Finkin, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1351, 1354–55
(1988).
77. See Yudof, supra note 76, at 1354–55.
78. See AACU Statement on Educational Responsibility, supra note 58; LYNN PASQUER-
ELLA, ASS’N OF AM. C. & U., Free Expression, Liberal Education and Inclusive Excellence (Apr.
2017), https://www.aacu.org/sites/default/files/files/about/FreeExpression2017.pdf [hereinafter
AACU Statement on Inclusive Excellence]. For an excellent and comprehensive discussion of
student academic freedom, see WILLIAM A. KAPLIN & BARBARA A. LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER
EDUCATION 852–68 (5th ed. 2013); see also ACADEMIC FREEDOM OF STUDENTS AND PROFESSORS,
supra note 73; AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, JOINT STATEMENT ON RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF
STUDENTS, reprinted in REDBOOK, supra note 52, at 381 [hereinafter STUDENT RIGHTS]. The Joint
Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students was adopted in 1967 by the AAUP, the Associa-
tion of American Colleges and Universities, and the United States Student Association and em-
braces broad speech freedoms for students in the context of their freedom to learn. See, id. at 383.
The Joint Statement is often referenced for the proposition that students are entitled to academic
freedom. See, e.g., Henry Reichman, On Student Academic Freedom, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Dec.
4, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2015/12/04/what-does-student-academic-free
dom-entail-essay. In practice, however, universities do not consistently follow the Joint Statement,
and legal cases that sometimes are identified as supporting a student right of academic freedom
generally have relied on the broader First Amendment freedoms that apply to the public market-
place. KAPLIN & LEE, supra, at 853–55; see, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); cf.
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181–82 (1972); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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Because academic freedom developed as a professional norm of
academia and not as a legal right,79 two related norms developed to safe-
guard faculty from potential violations of their academic freedom.80 The
first is tenure, which constrains universities’ ability to terminate faculty
who have met certain quality assurance standards.81 The second is shared
governance, which requires meaningful faculty involvement in university
policymaking and other matters that have the potential to significantly af-
fect either educational outcomes or faculty as a class of employees.82 Con-
sistent with this expectation, the most critical decisions affecting faculty,
such as faculty tenure and termination, are expected to involve some level
of peer review.83
In the best-case scenario, academic norms help ensure that faculty
within each university and across academia will hold each other accounta-
ble to high standards in the realm of ideas, thereby fostering a vibrant and
efficient university marketplace.84 In the worst-case scenario, they could
enable faculty within a university or across academia to keep standards low
or incentivize groupthink.85 The safeguard of shared governance also em-
powers faculty members in ways that can significantly challenge universi-
79. There is no common, legislated right of individual academic freedom. Universities and
faculty generally rely on contracts to allocate and resolve questions about their relative rights in
these areas. See Greene v. Howard Univ., 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Jim Jackson, Express
and Implied Contractual Rights to Academic Freedom in the United States, 22 HAMLINE L. REV.
467 (1999).
80. See FACULTY GOVERNANCE supra note 71, at 123; see also Gerber, supra note 71, at 23
(2001); Threat, supra note 63, at 84–85.
81. See 1940 STATEMENT, supra note 70; Bridget R. Nugent & Julee T. Flood, Rescuing
Academic Freedom from Garcetti v. Ceballos: An Evaluation of Current Case Law and a Propo-
sal for the Protection of Core Academic, Administrative, and Advisory Speech, 40 J.C. & U.L.
115, 154–55 (2014).
82. Other matters that typically involve peer review include, for example, faculty hiring,
evaluation, promotion, and grievances; the establishment of the curriculum and degree standards;
student conduct proceedings; and the approval of university mission and values statements, poli-
cies, strategic plans, and budgeting processes. See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, STATEMENT
ON GOVERNMENT OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, reprinted in REDBOOK, supra note 52, at 117
[hereinafter STATEMENT ON GOVERNMENT]; FACULTY GOVERNANCE, supra note 71, at 123; Nu-
gent & Flood, supra note 81, at 129, 153, & n.259.
83. These include faculty tenure and termination, see 1940 STATEMENT, supra note 70, at 16;
AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, RECOMMENDED INSTITUTIONAL REGULATIONS ON ACADEMIC
FREEDOM AND TENURE reprinted in REDBOOK, supra note 52, at 79, assessment of faculty scholar-
ship, see Rabban, supra note 17, at 234, 263, 285–86, 293; Special Concern, supra note 44, at
278, 301; Discipline and Freedom, supra note 19, at 205, 209–10, and university accreditation,
see, e.g., THE HIGHER LEARNING COMM’N, POLICY BOOK 17–26, 215–26 (2018), download.
hlcommission.org/policy/HLCPolicyBook_POL.pdf; Policies, Guidelines & Procedures, Middle
States Comm’n on Higher Educ., (Sept. 1, 2018), https://www.msche.org/?Nav1=POLICIES
&Nav2=INDEX.
84. Institutions in the Marketplace, supra note 32, at 857–59; Easy Answers, supra note 58,
at 1514; see Emergence, supra note 43, at 823.
85. See, e.g., Scott Jaschik, Professors Urge Students: ‘Think for Yourself,’ INSIDE HIGHER
EDUC. (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2017/08/30/professors-urge-
students-think-yourself.
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ties: the required involvement of faculty in decision-making processes can
have the effect of slowing change and making universities less agile and
nimble in rapidly evolving educational conditions.86 Perceived violations of
any academic norms can jeopardize administrators’ credibility and effec-
tiveness87 and lead to legal challenges.88
2. Institutional Autonomy: An Essential Complement to Individual
Academic Freedom
Inherent in the norm of academic freedom is an expectation of institu-
tional autonomy for universities—sometimes called institutional academic
freedom.89 A university can safeguard the academic freedom of its faculty
only if the university’s governing authorities leave the university free to do
so.90 At the same time, a university must retain sufficient autonomy from
those protected by individual academic freedom to enforce the limits and
conditions that define it.91
If truth-seeking is a core purpose of universities, and a competitive
marketplace is essential to the pursuit of truth,92 it may seem strange for
academia to adopt a norm that constrains and conditions scholars’ freedom
to pursue and promote ideas.93 Why not guarantee them the broader speech
freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment? This question is the key to
understanding universities’ distinctive role and treatment in the marketplace
of ideas.
Universities are not just academic institutions; they have dual institu-
tional identities and obligations, as academic and public or charitable orga-
nizations. Under both the self-imposed norms of academia, and the legally
86. See ASS’N OF GOVERNING BOARDS OF U. & C., Shared Governance: Changing with the
Times, 8–9 (Mar. 2017), https://www.agb.org/sites/default/files/report_2017_shared_governance.
pdf; Michael T. Miller & Myron L. Pope, Leadership in Faculty Governance, in POLICY AND
UNIVERSITY FACULTY GOVERNANCE 45, 48 (J.A. Caplow & M.T. Miller, eds., 2003).
87. See, e.g., Terrence MacTaggart, What Confidence Should Boards Give No-Confidence
Votes?, TRUSTEESHIP MAG. (Nov./Dec. 2012), www.agb.org/trusteeship/2012/11/what-confidence
-should-boards-give-no-confidence-votes.
88. See, e.g., McAdams v. Marquette Univ., 914 N.W.2d 708 (Wis. 2018).
89. See Rabban, supra note 17, at 229; Matthew W. Finkin, On ”Institutional” Academic
Freedom, 61 TEX. L. REV. 817, 825, 851 (1983) (“[I]nstitutional autonomy was perceived as an
integral element of the theory of academic freedom and played an important role in making Ger-
man institutions among the intellectually freest in the world.”); Statement on Academic Principles,
ASS’N OF AM. U. (April 2013), https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/files/AAU%20Files/AAU%20
Documents/Academic-Principles.pdf [hereinafter AAU Statement on Academic Principles]; Aca-
demic Freedom Statement of the First Global Colloquium of University Presidents, GLOBAL COL-
LOQUIUM OF U. PRESIDENTS (2005), http://www.columbia.edu/~md2221/global_colloquium.htm.
90. See Getting Real, supra note 61, at 939.
91. See Rabban, supra note 17, at 260; Discipline and Freedom, supra note 19, at 208–09.
92. See supra notes 42–60 and accompanying text.
93. In my observation, many university stakeholders do not understand that individual aca-
demic freedom and First Amendment freedoms are not coextensive. See also Discipline and Free-
dom, supra note 19, at 205; Gary Olson, The Limit of Academic Freedom, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.
(Dec. 9, 2009), https://www.chronicle.com/article/The-Limits-of-Academic-Freedom/49354.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\15-2\UST204.txt unknown Seq: 17  8-APR-19 13:09
374 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:2
imposed norms of public and charitable institutions, universities must un-
dertake a commitment to serve the common good94—that is, a purpose that
is broadly understood to benefit the public95—in the public trust.96 Univer-
sities are entrusted with public and charitable funding, and the benefits of
tax exemption, only because they have committed to pursue a common-
good mission,97 with the further condition that they will use organizational
resources only to advance this mission, and not for private benefit.98 Conse-
quently, in contrast to the public marketplace, the university marketplace is
not open for any discourse that serves participants’ fancy, and seeking mar-
ket attention is not a sufficient reason to participate.99 Contributions to the
94. Inazu, supra note 35, at 1193–95; see Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,
595 (1983) (affirming that an organization seeking tax-exemption “must demonstrably serve and
be in harmony with the public interest”); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)
(asserting that academic freedom is of “transcendent value to all of us, and not merely to the
teachers concerned”); 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 52, at 8 (“The responsibility of the univer-
sity as a whole is to the community at large”); 1940 STATEMENT, supra note 70, at 14 (“Institu-
tions of higher education are conducted for the common good and not to further the interest of
either the individual teacher or the institution as a whole. The common good depends upon the
free search for truth and its free exposition.”); Robert Post, Why Bother with Academic Freedom?,
9 FLA. INT’L UNIV. L. REV. 9, 12–13 (2013) [hereinafter Why Bother]; see also Discipline and
Freedom, supra note 19, at 210–12; Threat, supra note 63, at 138.
95. See The Common Good, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Feb. 26, 2018), https://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/common-good/. Others may substitute “public good” or “public benefit”
for “common good.” For the purpose of understanding the special obligations of educational orga-
nizations that are granted charitable status or are publicly funded and operated, these terms are
interchangeable. See generally WHAT IS COLLEGE FOR? THE PUBLIC PURPOSE OF HIGHER EDUCA-
TION (Ellen Condliffe Lagemann & Harry Lewis, eds., 2012).
96. Herrington J. Bryce, The Public’s Trust in Nonprofit Organizations: The Role of Rela-
tionship Marketing and Management, 49 CAL. MGMT. REV. 112 (2007); Kevin P. Kearns, Ethical
Challenges in Nonprofit Organizations: Maintaining Public Trust 265, 265–66, in ETHICS IN PUB-
LIC MANAGEMENT (H. George Frederickson & Richard K. Ghere, eds., 2d ed. 2015); Rabban,
supra note 17, at 233; AAU Statement on Academic Principles, supra note 89; see 1915 DECLA-
RATION, supra note 52, at 5 (asserting that both public and private universities “constitute[ ] a
public trust. The trustees [of universities] are trustees for the public. . . . They cannot be permitted
to assume the proprietary attitude and privilege, if they are appealing to the general public for
support.”).
97. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2015); MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION ACT § 1.40 (3d ed. 2008);
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. 574, 592 (to obtain tax exemption under § 501(c)(3), a university or
other organization “must demonstrably serve and be in harmony with the public interest. The
institution’s purpose must not be so at odds with the common community conscience as to under-
mine any public benefit that might otherwise be conferred.”); Bryce, supra note 96, at 114; see
1915 DECLARATION, supra note 52.
98. This obligation of public and charitable institutions is partly legal and partly self-regula-
tory in nature. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2015); Internal Revenue Service Publication, GOVERNANCE
AND RELATED TOPICS - 501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS (2008); MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION ACT,
supra note 97; ASS’N OF GOVERNING BOARDS OF U. & C., AGB BOARD OF DIRECTORS’ STATE-
MENT ON THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF GOVERNING BOARD MEMBERS (July 24, 2015), https://
www.agb.org/sites/default/files/u27174/statement_2015_fiduciary_duties.pdf; MINN. COUNCIL OF
NONPROFITS, PRINCIPLES & PRACTICES FOR NONPROFIT EXCELLENCE (2014), http://
www.minnesotanonprofits.org/PrinciplesPractices.pdf [hereinafter NONPROFIT EXCELLENCE];
Bryce, supra note 96, at 114, 128; Eileen Morrison, Enforcing the Duties of Nonprofit Fiducia-
ries: Advocating for Expanded Standing for Beneficiaries, 95 B.U. L. REV. (Annex) 1 (2015).
99. See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text.
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university marketplace, and its contributions to the public marketplace,
must reflect the more transcendent goal of truth-seeking and knowledge
promotion for the common good.
While truth-seeking, knowledge promotion, or a combination of the
two is the fundamental, common-good institutional mission of universities,
modern universities are diverse in kind and distinct in focus, and their mis-
sions have evolved over the past century to encompass a broader range of
educational activities than communities of scholars traditionally pursued.100
Universities customize their individual purposes101 based on professional
value judgments about how their particular university community can best
serve the common good.102 Universities’ community standards—my short-
hand description for a university’s stated mission, values, documented poli-
cies, customary practices (including self-imposed institutional norms), and
applicable law—reflect these judgments and tailored purposes, influence
the university’s decisions and allocation of resources, help shape the univer-
sity’s culture, and distinguish universities from each other.103 In turn, these
100. See supra note 56; Grutter’s First Amendment, supra note 17, at 508; Adam Daniel &
Chad Wellmon, The University Run Amok! Higher Education’s Insatiable Appetite for Doing
More Will Be Its Undoing, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 29, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/
article/Why-The-Universitys/244010; Sol Gittleman, Higher Education Has Always Been a Mess,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 15, 2015), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Higher-Ed-Has-Al
ways-Been-a/234162 (“[W]e have created a system of remarkable diversity and choice, made up
of 4,000 to 6,000 institutions . . . an astonishing mixture of private, public, two-year, four-year,
college, university, church-affiliated, faith-based, nonprofit, for-profit, on-campus, no-campus,
online, urban, and rural, and ranging from institutions with fewer than 100 students to others with
more than 80,000 and growing.”); AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC., Statement on Academic Rights and
Responsibilities (June 23, 2005), https://www.acenet.edu/news-room/Documents/Statement-on-
Academic-Rights-and-Responsibilities-2005.pdf [hereinafter ACE Statement] (“American higher
education is characterized by a great diversity of institutions, each with its own mission and pur-
pose. This diversity is a central feature and strength of our colleges and universities and must be
valued and protected.”).
101. ACE Statement, supra note 100 (“The particular purpose of each school, as defined by
the institution itself, should set the tone for the academic activities undertaken on campus.”);
Grutter’s First Amendment, supra note 17, at 508; see Easy Answers, supra note 58, at 1534.
102. A university’s particular pursuits are likely to be shaped by judgments about economic
and civic demands, educational needs of the communities they serve, and the services and educa-
tional environment they are best suited, or obligated, to provide in light of available resources and
the goals of their founders, as understood by the university community over time. Cathy N. David-
son, Is Higher Ed Omnivorous or Sucked Dry?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 3, 2018), https://
www.chronicle.com/article/Is-Higher-Ed-Omnivorous-or/244137; see  Daniel & Wellmon, supra
note 100; see also STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT’S A GOOD
THING TOO 104 (1994) [hereinafter NO SUCH THING]  (“Speech is never a value in itself but is
always produced within the precincts of some assumed conception of the good to which it must
yield in the event of conflict.”); Michael J. Baxter, Notes in Defense of Ex Corde Ecclesiae: Three
Replies to Three Typical Objections, 63 THOMIST 629, 631–33 (1999) (“[Fish’s argument] sug-
gests that all . . . appeals to academic freedom (as with freedom of speech) will at some point be
suspended for the sake of some overriding conception of the good.”).
103. Grutter’s First Amendment, supra note 17, at 572–73; see Kevin G. Creagh, Building an
Effective Bishop and President Relationship for the Mission of Catholic Higher Education: A
Case Study of Five Bishop and President Partnerships, 19 (2011) (explaining the importance of
the mission, beliefs, shared assumptions, and norms to motivating employees and building organi-
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\15-2\UST204.txt unknown Seq: 19  8-APR-19 13:09
376 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:2
distinctions influence faculty, students, and staff to join a particular univer-
sity, and donors to fund it, over other available choices.104
In order for universities to retain their community members, maintain
their funding, and advance their missions, their stakeholders must trust
them to steward their resources in accordance with the university’s known
community standards and culture.105 Institutional autonomy assures univer-
sity administrators of their authority to make choices that, in their profes-
sional judgment, best maintain integrity with these standards, thereby
preserving stakeholder trust.106
Institutional autonomy is not a common, legislated right of universities
across the United States,107 and the Constitution does not contain explicit
safeguards for universities or academia as a whole, as it does for religion
and the press.108 Accordingly, universities’ institutional autonomy is not
just necessary to preserve stakeholder trust, it is dependent on stakeholder
trust: If universities lose the trust of governing authorities (boards of trust-
ees, legislators, regulators, the courts, and, in the case of religiously affili-
ated universities, religious authorities), authorities may act to constrain
university autonomy. If universities lose the trust of stakeholders who can
exercise significant influence without authority (faculty, students, alumni,
donors, and the general public), a range of adverse consequences can re-
sult,109 all increasing the risk that governing authorities will act.110
zational culture). See generally Melanie M. Morey & John J. Piderit, S.J., CATHOLIC HIGHER
EDUCATION: A CULTURE IN CRISIS (2006) (addressing how Catholic universities maintain their
distinctive identities and cultures).
104. Grutter’s First Amendment, supra note 17, at 572–73; see Bryce, supra note 96, at 112,
114–15, 119, 123–24.
105. NONPROFIT EXCELLENCE, supra note 98; Bryce, supra note 96, at 113–14; Charles
Garofalo & Dean Geuras, Administrative Leadership and Transparency 69, 72–74, in ETHICS AND
INTEGRITY IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: CONCEPTS AND CASES (Raymond W. Cox III ed., 2009);
Kearns, supra note 96, at 270, 273; see also Easy Answers, supra note 58, at 1538. The AAUP
expects universities to inform students about its community standards and characteristics. STU-
DENT RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 385 n.2.
106. See Emergence, supra note 43, at 813–16.
107. Some states have sought to protect public university autonomy through constitutional
provisions. See Grutter’s First Amendment, supra note 17, at 585–86; Neal H. Hutchens, A Con-
fused Concern of the First Amendment: The Uncertain Status of Constitutional Protection for
Individual Academic Freedom, 36 J. C. & U. L. 145, 171 (2009).
108. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
109. These consequences may include, for example, a faculty no-confidence vote, see, e.g.,
MacTaggart, supra note 87, censure by academic peers, see, e.g., Colleen Flaherty, Censures for
Mizzou, Saint Rose, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (June 20, 2016), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/
2016/06/20/aaup-votes-censure-two-institutions-alleged-violations-academic-freedom-and-calls,
student protests, and the resignation of campus leaders. See, e.g., Scot Canon & Mara Rose Wil-
liams, Mizzou Struggles to Rebuild Image After Hits to Reputation, Enrollment, KAN. CITY STAR
(May 28, 2017), https://www.kansascity.com/news/state/missouri/article152939139.htmlstudent
protests.
110. Dan Simmons, Tenure, Shared Governance at UW Faces Uncertain Future as Legisla-
ture Tinkers with Scott Walker Budget, WIS. STATE J. (May 11, 2015), https://madison.com/wsj/
news/local/govt-and-politics/tenure-shared-governance-at-uw-face-uncertain-future-as-legislature/
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II. THE CURRENT APPROACH TO CAMPUS SPEECH: MUDDLED
MESSAGING AND MANAGEMENT
As flip sides of the same coin, it is natural for institutional autonomy
and individual academic freedom to be in tension.111 On one side, individ-
ual participants in the university marketplace want the maximum scope of
freedom to express, test, and promote ideas in pursuit of market attention
and acceptance. On the other, universities must ensure that these pursuits
maintain integrity with the university’s community standards, thus meeting
their institutional obligations and preserving stakeholder trust.112 When uni-
versities and their stakeholders reach different conclusions about whether
an individual’s pursuit or promotion of particular ideas is consistent with
the university’s institutional obligations, the situation is fraught: regardless
of how the university manages the tension, it risks compromising or appear-
ing to compromise its integrity,113 ultimately risking the university’s ability
to effectively advance its mission.114
Integrity is in the eye of the beholder, informed by observation, experi-
ence, and information encountered privately and in the marketplace of
ideas.115 Because universities’ public stakeholders may not engage directly
with any particular university on a regular basis (or at all), universities’ best
opportunity to influence public perceptions is through their documented
community standards and public marketplace communications. Universities
can help ensure the accuracy of all stakeholders’ perceptions by clearly ar-
ticulating and explaining their community standards, making choices con-
sistent with them, transparently explaining their choices, and holding
themselves accountable to their publicized standards.116 Problematically,
when it comes to speech and inclusive diversity, universities have been less
than clear and transparent about these standards, putting their accountability
and integrity in question.
article_f7aaed63-dfde-5836-9147-eb6cab7c3f13.html; Michael Stratford, Trump Administration
Seeks to Open Harvard Admission Files, POLITICO (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.kansascity.com/
news/state/missouri/article152939139.html; see, e.g., Daniel Turner, What State Legislatures Are
Doing to Protect Academic Freedom, AM. LEGIS. EXCHANGE COUNCIL (Jan. 11, 2016), https://
www.alec.org/article/what-state-legislatures-are-doing-to-protect-academic-freedom/.
111. See Threat, supra note 63, at 89.
112. See Emergence, supra note 43, at 828.
113. See id.
114. Kearns, supra note 96, at 266–67, 272–73; see Bryce, supra note 96, at 113–15.
115. Garofalo & Geuras, supra note 105, at 72–74; Kearns, supra note 96, at 272–73; Getting
Real, supra note 61, at 952; see Bryce, supra note 96, at 114–16, 119–20, 123–24; see also
Morrison, supra note 98, at 1, 4–6.
116. Bryce, supra note 96, at 116, 119–20, 123–24, 128–29; Garofalo & Geuras, supra note
105, at 74; see Kearns, supra note 96, at 273.
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A. Universities Set Inappropriate Expectations Regarding Speech
Freedoms in the University Marketplace
To advance their common-good truth-seeking and knowledge promo-
tion missions, universities must undoubtedly maintain an environment and
culture that support free inquiry, dialogue, and debate.117 At the same time,
their institutional identities and obligations require them to regulate speech
differently from the public marketplace, exercising judgment to make trade-
offs and choices they consider to most effectively advance their missions in
light of the circumstances and available resources.118 When addressing re-
cent campus speech tensions, universities and their faculty have failed to
acknowledge and effectively explain these necessary judgments and the in-
stitutional autonomy that enables them; instead, the dominant theme is an
unnuanced assertion that free speech is fundamental to university identity
and mission.119
In their public statements, universities and faculty repeatedly promote
the “more speech is better” approach to managing speech tensions.120 Even
117. This intent is clearly reflected in both the 1915 DECLARATION and the 1940 STATEMENT.
1940 STATEMENT, supra note 70, at 14; see 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 52, at 6; see also
supra Parts I.B and I.C.1.
118. AACU Statement on Inclusive Excellence, supra note 78, at 2 (“[T]hough the missions
of [individual universities] may be distinctive, they are united by the shared goals of educating
students and advancing knowledge. There are circumstances under which the achievement of both
objectives entails restrictions on free expression.”); Baxter, supra note 102, at 633; see NO SUCH
THING, supra note 102, at 104; supra Parts I.B and I.C.
119. See Paxson, supra note 5 (blurring the distinctions between First Amendment speech
freedoms and academic freedom by asserting that “freedom of expression is an essential compo-
nent of academic freedom”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Hate Speech Is Protected Free Speech, Even on
College Campuses, VOX (Updated Dec. 26, 2017), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/10/25/
16524832/campus-free-speech-first-amendment-protest (asserting that First Amendment freedom
of speech principles are essential to academic freedom); Keith E. Whittington, Commentary: Free
Speech Is a Core Tenet of the Academy. College Trustees Really Ought to Know That., CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Free-Speech-Is-a-Core-Tenet-of/
245264; GUIDELINES FOR GOVERNING BOARDS, supra note 8, at 10–11 (aligning academic free-
dom with free speech and asserting that faculty have the “same right to freedom of speech as do
other campus stakeholders”); see generally Hateful Incidents on Campus, supra note 5 (addressing
the value of freedom of expression solely in the context of the First Amendment, without any
mention of the distinctions of the university marketplace). Interestingly, while the free speech
advocacy organization FIRE asserts that public universities must comply with the same First
Amendment speech guarantees that apply to the public marketplace, it takes a more open-minded
approach to private university speech commitments than many academics. State of the Law:
Speech Codes, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EDUC., INC., https://www.thefire.org/in-court/
state-of-the-law-speech-codes/ (noting that it is acceptable for a private university to “define itself
as being committed to values other than free speech, as long as the school makes it publicly and
consistently clear that it holds a certain set of values above a commitment to free speech. . . . If a
private college clearly does not promise free speech, and the college makes this known publicly
and consistently, entering students have given informed consent and have voluntarily chosen to
limit their own rights—in much the same way students entering military academies or theological
seminaries understand that they are relinquishing many rights they would enjoy at a state
college.”).
120. Jonathan R. Alger, Free Speech Is Not a Free for All, TRUSTEESHIP MAG. (Sept./Oct.
2017), https://www.agb.org/trusteeship/2017/septemberoctober/free-speech-is-not-a-free-for-all
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private universities make statements that “prize[ ] and defend[ ] the right of
free speech” for their community members.121 Both public and private uni-
versities frame their speech policies using the same time, place, and manner
balancing construct the Court applies to speech in non-academic designated
and limited public forums.122 Unsurprisingly, this approach supports an ex-
pectation that universities must and will manage speech tensions the same
way the Court would manage them in the public marketplace.
But as free speech advocates regularly point out, in practice there is a
disconnect between universities’ statements and actions.123 Universities do
not consistently balance in favor of speech.124 They often prohibit hate
speech and other speech that the Court permits in the public marketplace,
(reinforcing the “more speech is better” approach by offering only First Amendment balancing
solutions to campus speech tensions); Private Universities, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN
EDUC., INC., https://www.thefire.org/spotlight/public-and-private-universities/ (noting that most
private universities hold themselves out a “bastions of free thought and expression” as if they were
governed by First Amendment rules); Yale University Report of the Committee on Freedom of
Expression at Yale, YALE UNIV. (Dec. 23, 1974), https://yalecollege.yale.edu/deans-office/reports/
report-committee-freedom-expression-yale [hereinafter Yale Report]; San Diego State University
Freedom of Expression Policy, SAN DIEGO STATE UNIV. (updated June 2014), https://news
center.sdsu.edu/ootp/images/sdsu_freedom_of_expression_policy.1.pdf; University of Michigan
Freedom of Speech, UNIV. OF MICH. (Oct. 2017), https://publicaffairs.vpcomm.umich.edu/key-
issues/freedom-of-speech-and-artistic-expression/; Carnegie Mellon University Freedom of Ex-
pression Policy, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV. (Feb. 2, 2007), https://www.cmu.edu/policies/adminis
trative-and-governance/freedom-of-expression.html; Yudof & Waltzer, supra note 7; see Paxson,
supra note 5; see also Easy Answers, supra note 58, at 1530–35; cf. Robert Post, There is No 1st
Amendment Right to Speak on a College Campus, VOX (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.vox.com/the-
big-idea/2017/10/25/16526442/first-amendment-college-campuses-milo-spencer-protests [herein-
after No 1st Amendment Right].
121. Freedom of Expression and Dissent, DARTMOUTH C. (July 1, 2015), https://student-af
fairs.dartmouth.edu/policy/freedom-expression-and-dissent; Report of the Committee on Freedom
of Expression, U. OF CHICAGO (2015), https://freeexpression.uchicago.edu/sites/freeexpression.
uchicago.edu/files/FOECommitteeReport.pdf; Speech and Expression Policy, GEORGETOWN U.
(Jan. 1989), https://studentaffairs.georgetown.edu/policies/speech-expression.
122. State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980); see Speech and Expression Policy, GEO.
UNIV. (Jan. 1989), https://studentaffairs.georgetown.edu/policies/speech-expression.
123. Michelle Epstein Garland, Hate Speech Versus Free Speech on College Campuses: Ex-
ploring the Viability of a Constitutional and Sustainable Campus Speech Code, U. OF TENN.
KNOXVILLE (2012), https://trace.tennessee.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1034&context=ccisym
posium (last visited Feb. 18, 2018); Benjamin Welch, An Examination of University Speech
Codes’ Constitutionality and Their Impact on High-Level Discourse, U. OF NEB. LINCOLN (Aug.
8, 2014), https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1046&context=journalism
diss; see Correcting Common Mistakes in Campus Speech Policies, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS IN EDUC., INC. (2016), https://www.thefire.org/spotlight/correcting-common-mistakes-in-
campus-speech-policies/ [hereinafter Correcting Common Mistakes].
124. CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Focus: Free Speech on Campus, and Its Limits, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC. (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.chronicle.com/resource/free-speech-on-campus-and-its/6121/
[hereinafter Free Speech on Campus]; Chris Quintana, Under Fire, These Professors Were Criti-
cized by Their Colleges, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (June 28, 2017), https://www.chronicle.com/arti
cle/Under-Fire-These-Professors/240457 [hereinafter Under Fire]; Spotlight on Speech Codes
2018: The State of Free Speech on our Nation’s Campuses, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN
EDUC., INC. (2018), https://www.thefire.org/spotlight-on-speech-codes-2018/ [hereinafter Spot-
light 2018]; see, e.g., Correcting Common Mistakes, supra note 123.
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but which individual universities consider to be inconsistent with their com-
munity standards.125 Universities regularly discipline faculty and students
whose speech is determined by administrators to offend these standards.126
Free speech advocates assert that even when universities purport to apply
the same balancing tests as the Court, universities apply time, place, and
manner restrictions and other constraints in ways that minimize free speech
opportunities to such a degree as to render them meaningless.127 What
causes this disconnect?
B. Universities Set Inappropriate Expectations About Their Balancing
Process
Because their frameworks look the same on paper, universities may
believe they follow the same speech-balancing approach as the Court. But
universities’ approach differs from the Court’s in three key ways that help
explain the disconnect between universities’ statements in support of free
speech and their actions.
1. Universities Weigh Speech Against Different Interests than the
Court, Including the Emerging Norm of Inclusive Diversity
When the Court balances speech interests, it considers whether unfet-
tered speech will materially disrupt widespread community norms and in-
terests that are not themselves unconstitutional.128 Given the scope of the
125. Free Speech on Campus, supra note 124; Yale Report, supra note 120; see Spotlight
2018, supra note 124.
126. See, e.g., Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 1448
(Apr. 3, 2017); McAdams v. Marquette Univ., 914 N.W.2d 708 (Wis. 2018).
127. Speech Code of the Month: Middle Georgia State University, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS IN EDUC., INC. (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.thefire.org/speech-code-of-the-month-middle
-georgia-state-university/; see Correcting Common Mistakes, supra note 123.
128. See supra notes 31–41 and accompanying text. The Court’s most controversial cases tend
to involve self-imposed community standards that are in the process of evolving, making it espe-
cially difficult to determine the appropriate constitutional outcome, and leading to split decisions.
See Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: The Justices; Context and the Court, N.Y. TIMES
(June 25, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/25/us/the-supreme-court-the-justices-context-
and-the-court.html. Greenhouse addresses the important role that societal context plays in Court
decisions, quoting Justice O’Connor: “‘[C]ourts, in particular, are mainly reactive institutions. . . .
[C]hange comes principally from attitudinal shifts in the population at large. . . . [R]are indeed is
the legal victory—in court or legislature—that is not a careful byproduct of an emerging social
consensus.’” Id. The cases involving “society’s most profound disputes,” id., have often resulted
in 5-to-4 decisions that, over time, contribute to erosion of public trust and confidence in the
Court. Sarah Turberville & Anthony Marcum, Those 5-to-4 Decisions on the Supreme Court? 9 to
0 Is Far More Common, WASH. POST (June 28, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
posteverything/wp/2018/06/28/those-5-4-decisions-on-the-supreme-court-9-0-is-far-more-com
mon/?utm_term=.9b0719e38de3. The Court, and particularly Chief Justice Roberts, seek to pre-
serve trust by achieving consensus through narrower decisions. Id.; Adam J. White, Judging Rob-
erts, WEEKLY STANDARD (Nov. 23, 2015, 12:00 AM), https://www.weeklystandard.com/adam-j-
white/judging-roberts (quoting a speech by Chief Justice Roberts: “‘[T]he broader agreement you
can get on the Court, the better,’ because it instills greater public confidence that the decision is
correct. ‘And the way you get to broader agreement is to have a narrower decision. . . . I happen to
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Court’s purview, the community it considers is usually large: the entirety of
society, the economy, a state, a city, or a national institution. Universities
do not need to balance with these broader community interests in mind,
except to the extent they are reflected in universities’ own community stan-
dards that reflect institutional obligations. So long as universities uphold the
law, the self-imposed norms of public and charitable academic institutions,
and their other self-imposed standards that are consistent with these obliga-
tions,129 they are free to weigh any other university interests they deem
relevant, and to value those interests in their discretion as professional edu-
cational administrators.
Individual interests in unfettered speech pose a strange counterweight
to university community norms, because academic freedom and the aca-
demic standards of individual disciplines inherently require universities to
regulate scholars’ speech consistent with the bounds of these norms, which
are not coextensive with public marketplace speech freedoms.130 Balancing
outcomes that favor unfettered speech over the narrower parameters of aca-
demic freedom or academic disciplinary standards obviously would materi-
ally disrupt the shared norms that govern the university marketplace, as
would balancing outcomes that weigh tenure rights, or other community
standards that bear the imprimatur of a shared governance process, less
heavily than individual interests in unfettered speech. This suggests that
unless the law compels otherwise,131 if a university is operating in accor-
dance with academic norms, then it is not only permissible, but obligatory
for universities to limit speech in the university marketplace consistent with
the bounds of academic freedom and other community standards.
Current campus speech tensions demonstrate that, although they are
not yet fully recognized as institutional norms, some of these other stan-
dards—namely, the interrelated values of diversity, civility, and safety that
define inclusive diversity132—are embraced by much of academia and
think that’s a good thing, that our decisions reach as narrowly as possible, rather than the justices
trying to write broadly to cover all sorts of situations that they might not have anticipated or
thought about carefully enough.’”).
129. See supra Part I.C; McConnell, supra note 66, at 309–10, n.18.
130. See supra Parts I.B and I.C.
131. As discussed in Part I.A and Part IV, the law generally does not compel universities to
follow the same free speech rules as apply to the public marketplace. While many public universi-
ties have created public forums on their campuses, there is no legal obligation for universities to
do so. See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text; see also supra Part IV.
132. There is no single, accepted term that embodies these interrelated values. Jeffrey Flier,
Against Diversity Statements, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.chronicle.com/
article/Against-Diversity-Statements/245400 (noting that despite the academic community’s wide-
spread view that diversity and inclusion are essential values, “the key terms—diversity, equity,
and inclusion—are rarely defined with specificity, and their meaning has been subtly shifting.”).
The Association of American Colleges and Universities (AACU), which represents approximately
1,400 colleges and universities that embrace the concept of a liberal education, introduced the
term “inclusive excellence” to reflect its commitment to both equity and quality of education,
juxtaposing faculty and student freedoms of inquiry and expression against students’ freedom to
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weighted heavily by many universities when balancing speech interests.133
Universities’ support for diversity by itself is not new; this interest has de-
veloped over the past century with society’s increasing attention to equity in
educational opportunities.134 More recently, universities are coming to un-
derstand, through growing attention to their students’ experiences and out-
comes and academically validated knowledge, that support for diversity is
meaningless if those who bring diversity to the marketplace feel so unwel-
come or unheard that they do not engage or persist.135 This awareness has
an effective educational environment: “A commitment to inclusivity, as well as respect for others
and free inquiry, must be paramount in maintaining an environment in which the free exchange of
ideas can thrive and in guiding the determination of whether speech is protected under academic
freedom.” AACU Statement on Inclusive Excellence, supra note 78, at 2. In an earlier statement,
AACU made the argument for civility: “In a learning context, one must both respect those who
disagree with oneself and also maintain an atmosphere of civility. Anything less creates a hostile
environment that limits intellectual diversity and, therefore, the quality of learning.” AACU State-
ment on Educational Responsibility, supra note 58, at 3.
133. See supra note 132; AACU Statement on Inclusive Excellence, supra note 78; ASS’N OF
GOVERNING BOARDS, GOVERNING BOARD ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CAMPUS CLIMATE, INCLUSION,
AND CIVILITY 5–7 (2016), https://www.agb.org/sites/default/files/agb-statements/statement_2016_
campus_climate.pdf [hereinafter CAMPUS CLIMATE] (noting that “[d]iversity is a part of the value
proposition” for universities “because of its demonstrated educational benefits for all students,”
“[d]iversity without inclusion is only a metric” and “requires sustained and intentional institu-
tional commitment and action,” and “[t]olerance and civility are at the heart of true freedom of
expression”); Hateful Incidents on Campus, supra note 5, at Background (“Recent events on col-
lege campuses—and in greater civil society—have too often juxtaposed the values of diversity
and inclusion against those of freedom of expression, when these values can and should be mutu-
ally reinforcing”); Lorelle L. Espinosa, Jennifer R. Crandall, & Philip Wilkinson, Free Speech and
Campus Inclusion: A Survey of College Presidents, HIGHER EDUC. TODAY (Apr. 9, 2018), https://
www.higheredtoday.org/2018/04/09/free-speech-campus-inclusion-survey-college-presidents/
(describing both campus inclusion and free expression as “ideals” and reporting that “[n]early all
[university] presidents indicated that promoting an inclusive society (98 percent) and protecting
freedom of speech (98 percent) are extremely or very important to our democracy, reinforcing the
understanding that these two concepts are not mutually exclusive”).
134. Angela Chen, Addressing Diversity on College Campuses: Changing Expectations and
Practices in Instructional Leadership, 7 HIGHER EDUC. STUDIES 17, 18 (Mar. 27, 2017); Susan
VanDeventer Iverson, Camouflaging Power and Privilege: A Critical Race Analysis of University
Diversity Policies, 243 EDUC. ADMIN. Q. 586, 599 (2007); Board Statement on Diversity, Equity,
and Inclusive Excellence, ASS’N OF AM. C. & U. (June 27, 2013), https://www.aacu.org/about/
statements/2013/diversity [hereinafter AACU Statement on Diversity]; see Statement on Diversity
by the Board of Directors of the Association of American Universities, ASS’N OF AM. U. (Dec. 18,
2015), https://www.aau.edu/newsroom/press-releases/statement-diversity-board-directors-associa
tion-american-universities.
135. See Chen, supra note 134, at 18–20 (addressing higher education’s increasingly nuanced
understanding of diversity and addressing the effects of exclusionary practices on the student
experience); Bryan McKinley Jones Brayboy, The Implementation of Diversity in Predominantly
White Colleges and Universities, 34 J. BLACK STUDIES 72, 72–74 (arguing that to achieve diver-
sity, it is insufficient for universities to increase numbers of underrepresented individuals; instead,
they must make wholesale changes in organizational structures and activities); Sylvia Hurtado et
al., Enhancing Campus Climates for Racial/Ethnic Diversity: Educational Policy and Practice, 21
REV. HIGHER EDUC. 279, 289–96 (1998); Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitu-
tional Narratives in Collision, 85 NW. U.L. REV. 343, 385–86 (1991) (arguing that racist speech
distorts discourse by disempowering minority rebuttal, “a result at odds, certainly, with market-
place theories of the first amendment”); Advancing Diversity and Inclusion in Higher Education:
Key Data Highlights Focusing on Race and Ethnicity and Promising Practices, U.S. DEP’T OF
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given rise to the additional interests of civility and safety.136 As I define and
apply these terms in the university context, civility is an expectation that
members of the community will treat each other with dignity,137 courtesy,
and professionalism. Safety is a shorthand way to describe an expectation
that all members of the university community will respect both the physical
and mental well-being of other community members—an expectation
grounded in an expanding notion of health that includes mental health,
which has been demonstrated to be critical to student success.138
EDUC., 3, 35–45 (Nov. 2016), https://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/research/pubs/advancing-diversity-in
clusion.pdf [hereinafter Advancing Diversity]; Piltch, supra note 4; AACU Statement on Diver-
sity, supra note 134; Christine M. Riordan, Diversity Is Useless Without Inclusivity, HARV. BUS.
REV. (June 5, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/06/diversity-is-useless-without-inclusivity?referral=
03758&cm_vc=RR_item_page.top_right; see generally DARYL G. SMITH, DIVERSITY’S PROMISE
FOR HIGHER EDUCATION (2009); RACE AND HIGHER EDUCATION: RETHINKING PEDAGOGY IN DI-
VERSE COLLEGE CLASSROOMS (Annie Howell & Frank Truitt, eds., 2003); Iverson, supra note 134,
at 599; Carol Elam & Gilbert Brown, The Inclusive University: Helping Minority Students Choose
a College and Identify Institutions that Value Diversity, 187 J. C. ADMISSION 14 (2005).
136. Robert Post suggests that student demands for civility and safety “reflect a desire for
universities to adopt an educational commitment that can properly be called in loco parentis”;
“[i]f universities were indeed to formulate their educational mission in this way, they would ac-
cept the obligation to educate the entire student, not just those aspects of students that directly
interact with the university environment.” Freedom of Speech and the University, supra note 35,
at 26. My own observations suggest a somewhat different characterization; they do not support the
proposition that an obligation to educate the “entire student” equates to the kind of authority,
responsibility, and control over students that in loco parentis suggests (although, in my view,
educating the “entire student” is wholly proper so long as universities clearly articulate this intent
as part of their community standards). Rather, it seems to me that students’ desire and universities’
obligation (regardless of whether they undertake the mission to educate the entire student) is to
maintain a learning environment that offers students the best opportunity to learn whatever lessons
the university seeks to offer (which may include, if the university is seeking to educate the whole
person, lessons that promote both intellectual and personal development, such as developing the
self-awareness and self-knowledge that often comes from engaging with challenging speech and
conduct untethered from particular disciplinary studies). Ensuring an effective learning environ-
ment for all students is a very different proposition than asserting parental control of student
speech and expressive conduct.
137. The concept of dignity is not clearly defined as a community norm within the United
States, but it has both moral and constitutional relevance. See Guy Carmi, Dignity Versus Liberty:
The Two Western Cultures of Free Speech, 26 B.U. INT’L L.J. 277, 283–89 (2008); R. George
Wright, Dignity and Conflicts of Constitutional Values: The Case of Free Speech and Equal Pro-
tection, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 527, 548–53 (2006). I use it to mean a level of mutual respect that
is more akin to its Catholic meaning: a “vision of the transcendent worth—the sacredness—of
human beings.” THE VATICAN, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 27 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinaf-
ter CATECHISM].
138. Mental Health on College Campuses: Investments, Accommodations Needed to Address
Student Needs, NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY (July 21, 2017), https://www.ncd.gov/sites/default/
files/NCD_Mental_Health_Report_508_0.pdf; see, e.g., Ingrid M. Nembhard & Amy C. Edmond-
son, Making It Safe: The Effects of Leader Inclusiveness and Professional Status on Psychological
Safety and Improvement Efforts in Health Care Teams, 27 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 941
(2006); see also CAMPUS CLIMATE, supra note 133, at 6 (“[I]ndividuals should have the right to be
safe from physical or emotional harm or harassment in their expression of ideas, beliefs, values,
lifestyles, diversity, and personal characteristics.”).
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The prevalence of university balancing outcomes that compromise in-
terests in unfettered speech in favor of inclusive diversity139 suggests that
inclusive diversity is an emerging institutional norm of universities, if not
all academia, that is becoming just as essential to modern university identity
and mission as other institutional norms.140 Some stakeholders have derided
balances that favor inclusive diversity over unfettered speech as unneces-
sary and even harmful “coddling” of university students, eroding the foun-
dational principles of free speech that these stakeholders understand to
define universities.141 This derision is rooted in a misunderstanding about
the unique role and freedoms of universities.142
While inclusive diversity directly competes with interests in unfettered
speech,143 it is fully consistent with the objectives that underlie the self-
regulatory system that governs the university marketplace.144 Maintaining
integrity with academia’s institutional purposes and norms requires univer-
sities to support not only a diversity of university marketplace participants,
but also an environment that ensures the generation and fair assessment of
their diverse ideas in furtherance of the university’s customized mission, in
accordance with academic standards of idea assessment.145 In other words,
safety and civility are necessary precursors for diverse offerors to offer di-
verse ideas, and to assure diverse offerors that their ideas will be fairly
139. See supra notes 124–27 and accompanying text.
140. See Grutter’s First Amendment, supra note 17, at 573 (“Institutional norms are not fixed.
They change and evolve as institutions do.”). See also Flier, supra note 132 (“Most in the aca-
demic community, including myself, see efforts toward greater diversity and inclusion as essential
to the core commitments of a humane and liberal society, such as eliminating inappropriate barri-
ers, creating equal opportunity, and displaying tolerance and respect for group differences.”).
141. GUIDELINES FOR GOVERNING BOARDS, supra note 8, at 9–11; Sessions, supra note 4;
Quintana, supra note 4; see, e.g., Cauce, supra note 3.
142. See supra Part I.C.2; see also Freedom of Speech and the University, supra note 35, at
22–27.
143. See Grutter’s First Amendment, supra note 17, at 507; GUIDELINES FOR GOVERNING
BOARDS, supra note 8, at 5 (describing the tension between “demands for unfettered freedom of
speech” and “the desires of students and communities for a safer, more civil environment”).
144. See supra Part I.C.1. See also Freedom of Speech and the University, supra note 35, at
22–27; Piltch, supra note 4 (“[M]any student demands [for inclusive diversity] aren’t inherently at
odds with liberalism. . . . In fact, a commitment to diversity can strengthen it: The more perspec-
tives and arguments that are brought forward, the better public discourse about freedom, justice
and equality can be.”).
145. See supra Parts I.B and I.C. See also Piltch, supra note 4 (“With student bodies that come
from increasingly different backgrounds, universities are being forced to reckon with the fact that
they haven’t historically valued the free expression of all groups equally. History and English
professors have made a concerted effort to address this problem in their classrooms. It’s not as
clear, though, that universities have confronted it in their public spaces. . . . Students are not
snowflakes unable to handle ideological difference. They’re simply using the free speech that
liberal universities have always valued in order to guarantee that the multicultural ideas and com-
mitment to intellectual justice they’ve learned in the classroom are respected outside the
classroom.”).
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evaluated, thereby fostering a competitive and efficient university
marketplace.146
Moreover, a university has no academic obligation to encourage or
support the pursuit or promotion of ideas that are judged by academic stan-
dards to be invalid, irrelevant, or of low or no value,147 or that the univer-
sity reasonably determines to be inconsistent with its institutional obligation
to serve the common good.148 If a university understands the common good
to require a commitment to inclusive diversity and the regulation of certain
kinds of speech in the university marketplace that it considers to compro-
mise that commitment, and its community standards clearly articulate its
commitment and regulatory parameters, it would be wholly proper—institu-
tionally—for the university to proceed with that regulation, so long as the
parameters are consistent with the bounds of academic freedom. Under
those circumstances, assigning less weight to inclusive diversity than to
speech that exceeds the bounds of academic freedom would rightly raise
concerns about institutional integrity.
2. Universities Do Not Clearly Define or Explain the Interests
They Weigh or the Balance They Strike
Published descriptions of campus speech tensions regularly identify in-
clusive diversity as a university interest that competes with free speech,149
and universities regularly make balancing decisions that compromise unfet-
146. See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text. The importance of inclusive diversity to
commercial marketplace efficiency also has been academically validated; see, e.g., David Feiter,
The Case for Team Diversity Gets Even Better, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 27, 2014), https://hbr.org/
2014/03/the-case-for-team-diversity-gets-even-better; Sylvia Ann Hewlett, Melinda Marshall &
Laura Sherbin, How Diversity Can Drive Innovation, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 2013), https://
hbr.org/2013/12/how-diversity-can-drive-innovation; Riordan, supra note 135.
147. ACE Statement, supra note 100, at 2 (“The validity of academic ideas, theories, argu-
ments and views should be measured against the intellectual standards of relevant academic and
professional disciplines. Application of these intellectual standards does not mean that all ideas
have equal merit. The responsibility to judge the merits of competing academic ideas rests with
colleges and universities and is determined by reference to the standards of the academic profes-
sion as established by the community of scholars at each institution.”); AACU Statement on Inclu-
sive Excellence, supra note 78, at 2 (“While all views have equal standing in the public square
under the First Amendment, this is not the case in the classroom.”). See DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE,
AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 21, at 7–8.
148. See supra notes 92–106 and accompanying text; see also Grutter’s First Amendment,
supra note 17, at 506–07; Aaron R. Hanlon, Why Colleges Have a Right to Reject Hateful Speak-
ers Like Ann Coulter, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 24, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/142218/
colleges-right-reject-hateful-speakers-like-ann-coulter (noting that a particular approach to divi-
sive speech is “the kind of value judgment that lies at the heart of a liberal arts education . . . . This
has always meant deciding what people needed to know, but also what they don’t need to know—
or at least which knowledge and skills deserved priority in one’s formal education.”).
149. Lorelle L. Espinosa, Jennifer R. Crandall & Elizabeth Howard, For College Students and
Presidents Alike, Free Speech Is a Balancing Act, HIGHER EDUC. TODAY (Apr. 9, 2018), https://
www.higheredtoday.org/2018/04/09/college-students-presidents-alike-free-speech-balancing-act/
(“[W]e also know that the tension is not over whether inclusion and speech are both important—
they are. It’s what campus communities do when trying to achieve both ideals in the face of
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tered speech in favor of inclusive diversity.150 But neither universities nor
the broader collective of academia has clearly acknowledged and defined
inclusive diversity as an essential institutional norm.151 This leaves stake-
holders to question the relative values of inclusive diversity and unfettered
speech and to puzzle over the rationale for apparent decision-making dis-
connects and inconsistent balancing outcomes.
Unless universities’ strong statements supporting free speech are truly
disingenuous, the only defensible justification for balancing outcomes that
disfavor speech is the exercise of institutional autonomy to protect an
equally compelling institutional obligation.152 But universities have failed
to connect their speech-balancing decisions to institutional autonomy,
which is rarely invoked outside of litigation.153 In some ways, this is unsur-
prising, as drawing attention to institutional autonomy has risks for both
faculty and universities. Faculty have a personal interest in maintaining the
maximum scope of freedom to pursue and promote their ideas; affirming
the university’s institutional autonomy risks narrowing that scope.154 Uni-
versities’ obligation to involve faculty in key decisions155 may make admin-
istrators wary of asserting institutional autonomy unnecessarily, lest it
provoke faculty ire. Absent certainty that governing authorities will pre-
serve their institutional autonomy, universities and faculty both may be con-
conflict.”); GUIDELINES FOR GOVERNING BOARDS, supra note 8, at 5; CAMPUS CLIMATE, supra
note 133, at 2; AACU Statement on Inclusive Excellence, supra note 78; see also supra notes 3–8.
150. See supra notes 124–27 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Thomason & Johnson,
supra note 7 (reporting the University of North Carolina chancellor’s simultaneous announcement
of her decision to resign and to remove a controversial Confederate monument that some saw as a
“symbol of white supremacy”; the chancellor explained her decision as “one that will promote
public safety, enable us to begin the healing process, and renew our focus on our great mission”).
151. See supra notes 15, 67 and accompanying text; supra note 132; AACU Statement on
Inclusive Excellence, supra note 78; AAU Statement on Academic Principles, supra note 89;
ACE Statement, supra note 100; Abigail Hauslohner & Susan Svrluga, Free Speech or Hate




152. See Freedom of Speech and the University, supra note 35, at 24; see also supra notes
95–106 and accompanying text.
153. See Rabban, supra note 17, at 229; Threat, supra note 63, at 135, 139, 141; Donna R.
Euben, Academic Freedom of Individual Professors and Higher Education Institutions: The Cur-
rent Legal Landscape, AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 11 (2002), https://www.aaup.org/issues/
academic-freedom/professors-and-institutions (“The AAUP’s focus is primarily on academic free-
dom as an individual right of professors,” and it has, “on occasion, addressed on an ad hoc basis
the scope of institutional academic freedom in responding to arguments made by college and
university administrations in litigation.”). The only other statement I could locate, outside of aca-
demic scholarship, defining universities’ institutional autonomy was the American Association of
Universities Statement of Academic Principles. AAU Statement on Academic Principles, supra
note 89.
154. See supra Part I.C.2.
155. See supra notes 79–83 and accompanying text.
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cerned that drawing attention to this unique institutional freedom could
result in efforts to constrain it. Accordingly, they stay mostly mum.156
Without clarity of expectation or explanation, stakeholders cannot an-
ticipate or understand the balance universities strike on speech. Universi-
ties’ failure to effectively articulate their institutional values and
commitments and to claim their autonomy leaves stakeholders in a muddle.
Those who understand or expect university identity and standards to include
a commitment to inclusive diversity are surprised by and critical of state-
ments and outcomes that favor unfettered speech. Those who understand
university identity and standards to incorporate the same free speech guar-
antees as apply to the public marketplace are surprised by and critical of
outcomes compromising speech freedoms in favor of an amorphous interest
in inclusive diversity.
Repeatedly failing to meet stakeholder expectations opens universities
to unnecessary risks that will compound over time. Ambiguity about institu-
tional and individual mission and commitments can lead to decreased en-
rollment and funding, constraining faculty and university freedoms through
involuntary budget reductions.157 Stakeholders who wish to exercise greater
control over university decision-making can leverage an apparent lack of
institutional integrity to their rhetorical and actual advantage.158 Universi-
ties may feel such pressure from influential stakeholders that they volunta-
rily compromise essential interests to accommodate the stakeholders with
the most authority or influence,159 jeopardizing their continued ability to
serve their distinctive societal role.
3. Universities Seek to Avoid Imbalances
Using the Court’s imbalancing approach to manage tensions between
equally essential interests is a real problem: assigning greater weight to ei-
ther interest undervalues the other. It appears many universities instead try
to achieve an even balance, accommodating both speech and competing
interests by compromising some aspects of each. This effort shows up, for
example, in policies that technically meet the Court’s time, place, and man-
ner tests but restrict time, place, and manner so significantly that the result-
ing speech freedoms are extremely limited,160 or require students to obtain
permission before demonstrating,161 or require sponsors of invited speakers
156. See No 1st Amendment Right, supra note 120.
157. See supra notes 100–06 and accompanying text.
158. Quintana, supra note 4; see, e.g., Sessions, supra note 4.
159. Audrey Williams June, Frustrated Faculty Struggle to Defend Tenure Before It’s Too
Late, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (June 17, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Frustrated-
Faculty-Struggle-to/243675; see, e.g., Colleen Flaherty, Wisconsin Tenure Wars: Part Two, IN-
SIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/11/03/u-wiscon
sin-madison-approves-faculty-backed-tenure-policy.
160. See Correcting Common Mistakes, supra note 123.
161. See id.
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to pay all security costs from the sponsor’s own budget.162 While on paper
universities may appear to apply the same speech rules as apply to the pub-
lic marketplace, in practice they do not always uphold their spirit.
C. A New Approach is Needed
In a metaphorical balancing process where stakeholders hope for an
imbalanced result, achieving an even balance among competing interests is
just as problematical as an imbalance. Even if a perfect balance is achieved,
the interests on each side remain separate and in competition. If the forces
on both sides are energized and dynamic, the balance will be delicate, and
any change in force on one side will require an opposing adjustment on the
other. If the forces are never reconciled and maintain their competitive en-
ergy, the competition and required adjustments could continue into
perpetuity. Calling a tie will not resolve the competition any better than a
clear win for one side; it will irritate everyone.
Stakeholders in the campus speech debates are energized and strongly
hold their competing positions. Regardless of how hard universities try to
convince inclusive diversity supporters to fight speech with more speech,
they are unlikely to overcome the legacy of inequity underlying the emerg-
ing norm of inclusive diversity.163 On the other side of the scale, as long as
universities continue to promote (or appear to promote) the same speech
freedoms guaranteed in the public marketplace, free speech absolutists will
never understand university decisions that compromise interests in unfet-
tered speech.
While stakeholders on both sides of speech tensions criticize universi-
ties for the balance they strike, their demands for change leave something to
be desired: namely, a workable approach that enables universities to articu-
late and manifest an equally strong commitment to speech and inclusive
diversity, in a way that maintains integrity with university identity and mis-
sion in this modern era. This approach can be found by looking to Catholic
universities.
III. THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY EXPERIENCE: HOLDING THE TENSION OF
COMPETING INTERESTS
A. The Development of Ex Corde Ecclesiae
To be recognized as a reputable member of academia, universities and
their scholars are expected to pursue truth and share knowledge that has
been validated and valued by their academic peers, pursuant to standards
they develop themselves, and to revise these truths to the extent they are
162. See id.
163. See Institutions in the Marketplace, supra note 32, at 834–35; see also Piltch, supra note
4.
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mooted or superseded by academia’s new truths or new methods of valida-
tion.164 To be recognized as Catholic,165 organizations and individuals are
expected to accept and share the divine truth as revealed to and articulated
by the Magisterium of the Church.166 Given these apparently conflicting
expectations,167 how can a Catholic university manifest its identity and mis-
sion as both Catholic and university? Over the past half-century,168 Catholic
universities have worked with key stakeholders to manage this tension in a
way that can be instructive for universities.
In the 1960s, a confluence of factors prompted influential, North
American leaders in Catholic higher education to initiate efforts to define
the nature and purpose of the modern Catholic university.169 They were
responding to the Vatican II ecumenical council, which called on Catholics
around the world to renew and modernize the Church.170 Their efforts also
reflected a desire to capitalize on demographic changes, which offered op-
portunities to expand Catholic higher education, increase Catholic universi-
164. See supra Part I.B.
165. 1983 CODE c.216, c.804 §§ 1–2; NAT’L CONF. OF CATH. BISHOPS, CATH. CHURCH, THE
APPLICATION FOR EX CORDE ECCLESIAE FOR THE UNITED STATES 14 n.31, (2000) [hereinafter
USCCB APPLICATION]; see JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC CONSTITUTION EX CORDE ECCLESIAE OF
THE SUPREME PONTIFF JOHN PAUL II ON CATHOLIC UNIVERSITIES 30–32 (1990) [hereinafter EX
CORDE]; see, e.g., John Hooper & Dan Collyns, Peru University in Vatican Battle Over Right to
Call Itself Catholic, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 28, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/
oct/28/peru-university-vatican-catholic.
166. CATECHISM, supra note 137, at 27; see SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, CATHOLIC CHURCH,
DOGMATIC CONSTITUTION ON DIVINE REVELATION, DEI VERBUM 10 (1965) (“[T]he task of authen-
tically interpreting the Word of God, whether written or handed on, has been entrusted exclusively
to the living teaching office of the Church, whose authority is exercised in the name of Jesus
Christ. This teaching office is not above the Word of God, but serves it, teaching only what has
been handed on, listening to it devoutly, guarding it scrupulously and explaining it faithfully in
accord with a divine commission and with the help of the Holy Spirit; it draws from this one
deposit of faith everything which it presents for belief as divinely revealed.”).
167. See Charles L. Currie, S.J., Pursuing Jesuit, Catholic Identity and Mission at U.S. Jesuit
Colleges and Universities, 14 CATH. EDUC. J. INQUIRY & PRAC. 346, 347 (2011); Neil G. McClus-
key, S.J., Land O’Lakes Statement on the Nature of the Contemporary Catholic University, UNIV.
NOTRE DAME PRESS (1967) [hereinafter Land O’Lakes Statement]; McConnell, supra note 66, at
309–10 n.18; Emergence, supra note 43, at 6–7 (“The very possibility of a sustained reconcilia-
tion of one sort or another of a distinctive faith mission commitment with individual academic
freedom is contestable.”).
168. The Catholic-university tension has been recognized and discussed for a much longer
period, but the 1960s marked the start of earnest efforts by North American Catholic leaders to
address this tension. See Currie, supra note 167, at 346; Matthew Garrett, The Identity of Ameri-
can Catholic Higher Education: A Historical Overview, 10 CATH. EDUC.: J. INQUIRY & PRAC.
229, 239 (2006); see, e.g., John Henry Newman, THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY (Frank M. Turner
ed., 1996). See generally Hoye, supra note 44.
169. Currie, supra note 167, at 347; Garrett, supra note 168, at 229–47; David J. O’Brien, A
Catholic Academic Revolution, in MISSION & IDENTITY: A HANDBOOK FOR TRUSTEES OF CATHO-
LIC COLLEGES & UNIVERSITIES 23 (2004) [hereinafter Catholic Academic Revolution]; David J.
O’Brien, “The Land O’Lakes Statement,” B.C. MAG., Winter 1998, at 3.
170. Garrett, supra note 168, at 238; see Catholic Academic Revolution, supra note 169, at
23–24.
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ties’ academic standing, relevance, and influence, and respond more
effectively to student demands for a high quality education.171
In these leaders’ judgment, renewing Catholic higher education would
require Catholic universities to attain a level of academic and professional
excellence comparable to their secular peers; this in turn would require an
unwavering commitment to both individual academic freedom and the insti-
tutional autonomy that enables it.172 They could not make this commitment
unilaterally. Catholic organizations are dependent on the Church to affirm
their Catholic identity; under the Church’s principles of subsidiarity, the
local ecclesiastical authority has discretion whether to recognize an organi-
zation as Catholic.173 There is no guarantee that local Church leaders will
appreciate and support Catholic universities in upholding the norms that
mark universities as reputable members of academia, while still recognizing
them as Catholic. Indeed, the prior experience of some U.S. Catholic uni-
versities reflected a lack of alignment with their local bishops and religious
superiors, raising the specter of academic compromises.174 Accordingly, it
was important for Catholic university leaders to confront the Catholic-uni-
versity tension in concert with the Church.
The North American leaders effectively forced this confrontation in
1967,175 with their development of the “Statement on the Nature of the
Contemporary Catholic University.”176 The Land O’Lakes Statement, as it
commonly is called, expressed a vision for the modern Catholic university
that emphasized the essential nature of both academic freedom and institu-
tional autonomy.177 It kicked off a rich, vigorous, and long debate and dia-
logue about the nature and role of the Catholic university in the modern era,
and the tension between Catholic and university identity.178 Eventually, it
led to the issuance of the Apostolic Constitution Ex Corde Ecclesiae by
Pope (now Saint) John Paul II in 1990.179 Ex Corde articulates the defini-
171. These opportunities were primarily based on changed demographics, increased prosperity
among Catholics, and increased federal financial aid. Currie, supra note 167, at 349; Garrett,
supra note 168, at 238; see Catholic Academic Revolution, supra note 169, at 24.
172. See Land O’Lakes Statement, supra note 167, at ¶ 1 (“The Catholic University today
must be a university in the full modern sense of the word, with a strong commitment to and
concern for academic excellence. . . . institutional autonomy and academic freedom are essential
conditions of life and growth and indeed of survival for Catholic universities as for all
universities.”).
173. Creagh, supra note 103, at 4; see 1983 CODE c.808.
174. See Catholic Academic Revolution, supra note 169, at 26.
175. Currie, supra note 167, at 349; Garrett, supra note 168, at 238; see Catholic Academic
Revolution, supra note 169, at 24.
176. Land O’Lakes Statement, supra note 167.
177. See id.
178. See generally Catholic Academic Revolution, supra note 169 (discussing the “continuing
dialogue” that initiated with the Land O’Lakes Statement and the effectiveness of efforts to
achieve its vision).
179. EX CORDE, supra note 165; see Stephen J. Denig, Between a Rock and a Soft Place, 11
CHRISTIAN HIGHER EDUC. 44, 45 (2012). While Ex Corde is “normative for the Church throughout
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tive vision for modern Catholic universities worldwide; it defines the role,
essential characteristics, and general norms of the modern Catholic univer-
sity, including its relationship with the Church and Church teaching.180
These essential characteristics and norms include both academic freedom
and institutional autonomy.181
B. Holding the Catholic-University Tension
The Land O’Lakes Statement was and remains controversial among
Catholic university stakeholders. Some commentators and critics have con-
sidered it to be the opening salvo in a battle for primacy between Catholic
and university.182 Others have reinforced this perspective by framing Ex
Corde, and the work to address the Catholic-university tension, as a balanc-
ing process.183 As with the Court and university approaches to managing
speech tensions,184 characterizing the management of Catholic and univer-
sity tensions as a balancing process sets up a competition of essential inter-
ests. An imbalanced outcome will undervalue one interest,185 and an even
balance is likely to compromise both.186 Either way, with competing stake-
holders remaining on separate sides of the scale, maintaining the balance
will be a perpetual struggle.187
I have a different view of what Ex Corde intended, which is supported
by its plain language and offers a more compelling and inspiring vision for
Catholic universities than the balancing characterization allows. As I read
it, Ex Corde envisions that Catholic universities will hold the tension of
their Catholic and university identities, with the intent for these interests to
converge and transform into something new and more potent than a balanc-
ing process could ever achieve: a true synthesis of essential interests into a
united and harmonized one.188 Imagine two streams of electricity that con-
the world,” Ex Corde explicitly recognized the need to tailor its application to reflect regional
differences in education. It provided that bishops in each region of the world would establish
implementing guidelines for their region. Bishops were expected to “tak[e] into account the status
of each college and university and, as far as possible and appropriate, civil law.” EX CORDE, supra
note 165, at General Norms, Art. 1 ¶ 2; USCCB APPLICATION, supra note 165.
180. See id.; USCCB APPLICATION, supra note 165; Currie, supra note 167, at 347.
181. See Ex Corde, supra note 165.
182. Creagh, supra note 103, at 30–31; see Catholic Academic Revolution, supra note 169, at
27–30.
183. Catholic Academic Revolution, supra note 169, at 30; Creagh, supra note 103, at 70–71;
Charles E. Curran, ‘Ex Corde Ecclesiae’ and its Ordinances: Is This Any Way to Run a University
or a Church, COMMONWEAL, Nov. 19, 1993, at 14–15, 22; Garrett, supra note 168, at 245; see,
e.g., Francis George, Ex Corde Ecclesiae: Promises and Challenges, 4 CATH. EDUC.: J. INQUIRY
& PRAC. 239, 241 (2000).
184. See supra notes 22–29, 122 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II.C.
185. See supra Part II.B.3.
186. See id.
187. See supra Part II.C; see also Baxter, supra note 102, at 632.
188. The idea of holding the tension of opposing forces is found in the work of both psycho-
therapist Carl Jung and theoretical physicist David Bohm. See also Creagh, supra note 103, at 56,
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tinuously push at each other until they meld and create a more powerful
energy flow: an integration of two separate institutions, Catholic and uni-
versity, into the new and singular institution of Catholic university.189
Ex Corde holds the Catholic-university tension by binding together the
institutional mission and obligations of universities with the institutional
mission and teaching of the Church, providing clarity on matters that uni-
versities usually are left to determine for themselves: when they will know
they have identified truth, what it means to serve the common good, and the
appropriate scope of institutional autonomy. Ex Corde confirms that every
Catholic university “possesses that institutional autonomy necessary to per-
form its functions effectively and guarantees its members academic free-
dom, so long as the rights of the individual person and of the community
are preserved within the confines of the truth and the common good.”190
“Common good” is a foundational principle of Catholic social teach-
ing, similar to but more precisely defined than the “common good” that
universities generally are expected to serve, and motivated by an even more
fundamental obligation: to preserve human dignity.191 “Truth” is best un-
92–93, 105. Creagh notes that the relationship between Church and university is intended to be
one of communion, that is, a communion between Church and university. Within the Church, the
concept of communion “always involves a double dimension: the vertical (communion with God)
and the horizontal (communion among men).” Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Letter
to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on Some Aspects of the Church Understood as Communion,
at ¶ 3 (May 28, 1992). Michael Baxter reflects this concept by describing Ex Corde as “locating
[academic freedom] within a more substantive and comprehensive Catholic intellectual vision [in
which] genuine intellectual inquiry is ordered to what has been revealed by God as true and
good.” Baxter, supra note 102, at 632.
189. See Creagh, supra note 103, at 56, 92–93, 105; George, supra note 183, at 239, 247; Julie
H. Sullivan, President, Univ. of Saint Thomas (Minn.), Academic Convocation Speech at the
University of Saint Thomas (Sept. 7, 2017). President Sullivan described the intent of the Catholic
university leaders at Land O’Lakes as the creation of an integrated, two-word noun, “Catholic
university,” rather than a modified noun—a university that is Catholic or a Catholic institution
that is a university. See also John Garvey & Mark W. Roche, What Makes a University Catholic?
An Exchange on Mission and Hiring, COMMONWEAL (Jan. 26, 2017), https://
www.commonwealmagazine.org/what-makes-university-catholic; Michael Sean Winters, Catholic
Identity at Catholic Colleges Is Complicated, NAT’L CATH. REPORTER: DISTINCTLY CATH. (July
31, 2017), https://www.ncronline.org/blogs/distinctly-catholic/catholic-identity-catholic-colleges-
complicated.
190. EX CORDE, supra note 165, at General Norms, 12, 29 (emphasis added); see Baxter,
supra note 102, at 632 (noting that in Ex Corde, “the Pope affirms academic freedom not as an
abstract, general principle to be applied regardless of the specific content of academic inquiry
being pursued (there’s no such thing), but as a principle embedded in an overring scale of values:
academic-freedom-as-defined-by-truth-and-the-common-good.”). See also supra note 102.
191. See supra note 137; supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text. In Catholic doctrine,
common good is defined as “the sum total of social conditions which allow people, either as
groups or as individuals, to reach their fulfillment more fully and more easily. . .” SECOND VATI-
CAN COUNCIL, PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD, GAUDIUM ET
SPES; PROMULGATED BY HIS HOLINESS POPE PAUL VI ON DECEMBER 7, 1965, #26 Section 1
(1998). The basis for all moral teachings of the Church is based upon the Catholic concept of
human dignity, which is the fundamental motivation for the imperative to advance the common
good:
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derstood in the context provided by Pope Saint John Paul II in his introduc-
tion to Ex Corde, which explicitly references the intent to hold the tension:
With every other University [the Catholic University] shares that
gaudium de veritate . . . which is that joy of searching for, discovering and
communicating truth in every field of knowledge. A Catholic University’s
privileged task is “to unite existentially by intellectual effort two orders of
reality that too frequently tend to be placed in opposition as though they
were antithetical: the search for truth, and the certainty of already knowing
the fount of truth.”192
Within these confines of truth and the common good, Ex Corde de-
fines institutional autonomy and academic freedom in ways that reflect the
understanding of academia generally, but in my view, with greater clarity
and deference to educational judgment. Institutional autonomy “means that
the governance of an academic institution is and remains internal to the
institution.”193 Academic freedom is:
the guarantee given to those involved in teaching and research
that, within their specific specialized branch of knowledge, and
according to the methods proper to that specific area, they may
search for the truth wherever analysis and evidence leads them,
and may teach and publish the results of this search, keeping in
mind the cited criteria, that is, safeguarding the rights of the indi-
vidual and of society within the confines of the truth and the com-
mon good.194
C. The Obligations and Effects of Ex Corde
Ex Corde builds its vision and expectations for Catholic universities by
first affirming the institutional obligations of universities, and then explain-
ing how Catholic identity informs the execution of these obligations by
Catholic universities.195 In effect, Ex Corde simply adds a layer of custom-
The common good consists of three essential elements: respect for and promotion of the
fundamental rights of the person; prosperity, or the development of the spiritual and
temporal goods of society; the peace and security of the group and of its members.
The dignity of the human person requires the pursuit of the common good. Everyone
should be concerned to create and support institutions that improve the conditions of
human life.
It is the role of the state to defend and promote the common good of civil society. The
common good of the whole human family calls for an organization of society on the
international level.
CATECHISM, supra note 137, at Sections 1925–27; see also POPE JOHN PAUL II, EVANGELIUM
VITAE, ENCYCLICAL OF POPE JOHN PAUL II ON CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIAL PROGRESS (Mar. 25,
1955); SAINT JOHN XXIII, MATER ET MAGISTRA, ENCYCLICAL OF POPE JOHN XXIII ON CHRISTI-
ANITY AND SOCIAL PROGRESS no. 219 (May 15, 1961).
192. EX CORDE, supra note 165, at Introduction (citations omitted).
193. Id.
194. Id. (emphasis added).
195. In the introduction to Ex Corde, Pope Saint John Paul II states:
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ized community standards, consistent with universities’ other institutional
obligations, that are common to all Catholic universities and help guide
them in the development and implementation of their individualized com-
munity standards.196 Indeed, Ex Corde expressly anticipates that individual
Catholic universities will develop individualized mission statements and
norms reflecting their individualized educational objectives, communities,
and cultures, within the common Ex Corde framework.197 Their mission
statements or another public document must identify the university as Cath-
olic and not just university,198 and they must inform all faculty of the impli-
cations of Catholic identity in advance of appointment.199 These obligations
help ensure that even if academic stakeholders are unfamiliar with Ex
Corde, they will be aware of Catholic universities’ distinctive, interwoven
identity, and that both components of this identity must inform stakeholder
expectations about the Catholic university’s mission, values, norms, and
operations.200
If it is the responsibility of every University to search for such meaning, a Catholic
University is called in a particular way to respond to this need: its Christian inspiration
enables it to include the moral, spiritual and religious dimension in its research, and to
evaluate the attainments of science and technology in the perspective of the totality of
the human person.
In this context, Catholic Universities are called to a continuous renewal, both as “Uni-
versities” and as “Catholic.” For, “What is at stake is the very meaning of scientific and
technological research, of social life and of culture, but, on an even more profound
level, what is at stake is the very meaning of the human person.” Such renewal requires
a clear awareness that, by its Catholic character, a University is made more capable of
conducting an impartial search for truth, a search that is neither subordinated to nor
conditioned by particular interests of any kind.
EX CORDE, supra note 165, at Introduction (citations omitted); see also id. at Part B, ¶ 27 (“Every
Catholic University, without ceasing to be a University, has a relationship to the Church that is
essential to its institutional identity.”); USCCB APPLICATION, supra note 165, at Art. 2 ¶ 1 (“The
purpose of a Catholic university is education and academic research proper to the disciplines of
the university. Since it enjoys the institutional autonomy appropriate to an academic institution, its
governance is and remains internal to the institution itself. This fundamental purpose and institu-
tional autonomy must be respected and promoted by all, so that the university may effectively
carry out its mission of freely searching for all truth.”) (citations omitted).
196. See supra Part I.C; EX CORDE, supra note 165, at Part B, ¶ 30 (“The basic mission of a
University is a continuous quest for truth through its research, and the preservation and communi-
cation of knowledge for the good of society. A Catholic University participates in this mission
with its own specific characteristics and purposes.”).
197. EX CORDE, supra note 165, at General Norms, Art. 1 ¶ 3 (“It is contemplated that other
Catholic Universities, that is, those not established or approved [directly by the Church], with the
agreement of the local ecclesiastical Authority, will make their own the General Norms and their
local and regional applications, internalizing them into their governing documents, and, as far as
possible, will conform their existing Statutes both to these General Norms and to their
applications.”).
198. Id. at General Norms, Art. 2 ¶ 3; see, e.g., MARQ. UNIV. MISSION, http://www.marquette
.edu/about/mission.php; UNIV. DAYTON MISSION & IDENTITY, https://www.udayton.edu/about/mis
sion-and-identity.php; UNIV. ST. THOMAS MISSION & CONVICTIONS, https://www.stthomas.edu/
mission/.
199. See EX CORDE, supra note 165, at General Norms, Art. 4 ¶ 2.
200. EX CORDE, supra note 165, at General Norms, Art. 2 ¶ 3.
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The specificity of Ex Corde’s general norms provide Catholic universi-
ties and their stakeholders with clear guidance regarding the proper motiva-
tions and parameters for Catholic universities’ community standards, and
the ultimate stakes against which their work must be measured. This align-
ment of expectations and understanding is particularly important when it
comes to Catholic university presidents and local Church leaders. The local
bishop, effectively the Catholic accreditor for Catholic universities,201 may
not have the academic background to fully understand that Catholic univer-
sity identity is not the product of a balancing act where one force trumps or
compromises the other. On the other hand, academic leaders may not fully
understand the power of the unified Catholic university vision and how best
to hold the tension of these two forces. Ex Corde seeks to ensure that Cath-
olic universities and local Church leaders effectively advance a unified vi-
sion through an explicit expectation that the local bishop and university
president will maintain a close, collaborative, relationship and continuous
dialogue about the university’s distinctive identity and mission and how to
ensure they will permeate its operations and culture.202
Ex Corde goes one step further by directly addressing, not just those
who directly engage with Catholic universities, but “all those who have an
interest in” Catholic universities, effectively charging every Catholic with
responsibility for the fulfillment of Catholic universities’ “indispensable”
mission.203 In this way, Ex Corde incentivizes Catholic universities to
maintain the mission clarity and transparency that Ex Corde expects: clarity
about community standards and transparency about Catholic universities’
decisions make it easier for stakeholders to assess whether Catholic univer-
sities are meeting their institutional and individualized obligations.204 In
other words, Ex Corde incentivizes Catholic universities to hold themselves
accountable.205 If Catholic universities take Ex Corde seriously, their dis-
tinctive Catholic university identity, mission, and norms will drive their
201. Because of universities’ institutional autonomy, academia developed the practice of ac-
creditation, whereby private accrediting associations engage external peer reviewers to review
individual universities and programs to determine whether they meet minimum institutional stan-
dards of quality. Under federal law, only universities that are accredited by federally recognized
accreditors are eligible to use federal student aid funds. See Accreditation in the United States,
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/admins/finaid/accred/accreditation_pg2.html. There is
no similar accrediting association that evaluates all Catholic universities to determine whether
they comply with the institutional obligations established by Ex Corde and the USCCB Applica-
tion; this is left to the local ecclesiastical authority. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
202. Creagh, supra note 103, at 7, 17; see EX CORDE, supra note 165, at Part I, ¶ 28; see also
id. at General Norms, Art. 5.
203. See EX CORDE, supra note 165, at Introduction.
204. See Kearns, supra note 96, at 273.
205. Cf. Creagh, supra note 103, at 114 (noting that in practice, trust builds more effective
Church-university partnerships than the idea of accountability to rules).
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customized community standards and become integral to their culture and
operations, thereby fulfilling Ex Corde’s vision.206
The aspiration to achieve a true integration of Catholic and university
is not perfect or complete by any means.207 Transformation takes time, and
individual organizations progress at their own pace. No doubt some Catho-
lic universities pursue this work more effectively than others, and some
stakeholders engage with Catholic universities more seriously or in richer
or more nuanced ways than others. However, as an exercise in clarity, trans-
parency, and accountability, Ex Corde has been effective. Since its publica-
tion, Catholic universities and their stakeholders have continued to engage
in communal debate and dialogue regarding the best ways to manifest Ex
Corde’s vision that all aspects of Catholic university operations will radiate
from and advance Catholic university identity.208 Without the publication of
Ex Corde, these efforts may have been haphazard or may not have occurred
at all. Ex Corde’s true value is that as a consequence of its publication,
Catholic universities feel obligated to engage with it, “respond[ing] with
diverse ways to enhance their Catholic identity . . . and [striving] to become
institutions ‘from the heart of the church.’”209
206. See generally Morey & Piderit, supra note 103 (addressing Catholic universities’ efforts
to maintain their distinctive identities and cultures while also competing effectively with the
broader universe of universities).
207. See THEODORE M. HESBURGH, THE CHALLENGE AND PROMISE OF A CATHOLIC UNIVER-
SITY (1994); John M. Breen & Lee J. Strang, The Golden Age That Never Was: Catholic Law
Schools from 1930–1960 and the Question of Identity, 7 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 489, 489–91,
515–16 (2010); James Tunstead Burtchaell, The Dying of the Light: The Disengagement of Col-
leges and Universities from Their Christian Churches, 16 J.L. & RELIGION 437 (2001); see also
David J. O’Brien, Developing American Saints: The Contribution of Catholic Higher Education to
the American Experience, CRESSET: REV. LITERATURE, ARTS & PUB. AFF. (2007).
208. See, e.g., Creagh, supra note 103, at 2, 72–73, 100, 103; George, supra note 183, at
242–43; University of Notre Dame Conference: Transcending Orthodoxies, Oct. 29–Nov. 1, 2015.
The websites of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops Higher Education and the Association of
Catholic Colleges and Universities also contain numerous examples of the ways in which Catholic
universities and their stakeholders have worked to manifest the vision of Ex Corde. U.S. CONF.
CATH. BISHOPS HIGHER EDUC., http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/how-we-teach/catho
lic-education/higher-education/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2018); ASS’N CATH. C. & U., https://www
.accunet.org/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2018). In a simple example, the Association of Catholic Col-
leges and Universities (ACCU) publishes a series of “Strengthening Catholic Identity” brochures
to help Catholic universities enhance the manifestation of their distinctive identity and mission
across all aspects of university operations. See Strengthening Catholic Identity, ASS’N CATH. C. &
U., http://www.accunet.org/Strengthening-Catholic-Identity (last visited Sept. 1, 2018). These
guides address leaders and units across the university, with specific guides for presidents, chief
academic officers, mission officers, faculty, student access and admissions, student affairs, stew-
ardship, and campus operations, among others. See id.
209. Jason King, After Ex Corde Ecclesiae, 4 J. MORAL THEO. 167, 174, 190–91 (2015). King
notes:
There is neither a platonic form of “Catholic identity” that can be attached to any and
every Catholic university nor an assembly line method for cranking out “Catholic iden-
tity” widgets for any institution to purchase. One needs a philosophy of Catholic educa-
tion that works in the particularities of an institution and culture, particularities that one
often discovers through sociological research. This vision then has to be embedded in
the mission of the institution, understood by administrators, enacted in the policies, and
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM: THE COURT’S
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT OTHER UNIVERSITY INTERESTS ARE
AS ESSENTIAL AS SPEECH
There is no universally applicable document, like Ex Corde, that ex-
plicitly guides the management of speech tensions in the university market-
place. Universities and their stakeholders must look to universities’
community standards, including both their self-imposed purposes and
norms and the externally imposed norms of applicable law. Because there is
no common, legislated right of institutional autonomy or academic freedom
across the United States, universities and their scholars usually turn first to
contract law to enforce their respective rights.210 When it is not clear
whether contract law applies, they look to the Constitution.
Constitutional guarantees are generally understood to apply to univer-
sities on the same basis as they apply to public marketplace participants211:
Private universities are not legally subject to constitutional requirements;
effectively, the Constitution guarantees their freedom to regulate speech on
campus, so long as the regulation does not violate constitutionally permissi-
ble contractual or statutory obligations (which means they can voluntarily
adopt constitutional obligations if they so choose).212 Public universities, as
state actors, are subject to constitutional requirements and therefore may
regulate speech on campus only to the extent such regulation is consistent
with constitutional guarantees, as interpreted by the courts. Accordingly,
the public university marketplace is typically regulated through the lens of
forum analysis, considering public universities to be limited or designated
public forums because they generally reserve some parts of the university
(classrooms, offices) for non-public uses, while leaving other parts (audito-
reflected in classroom pedagogies. It is a bit like putting together a puzzle, trying to fit
numerous pieces into a coherent whole. Internal issues, however, constitute only part of
the challenges. Catholic colleges and universities work on their Catholic identity amidst
external pressures from federal regulations, academic norms, economic exigencies, and
ecclesial expectations. So, it is a bit like working on a puzzle on a stage, in a competi-
tion, broadcasted on television, with a multi-million dollar prize.
Id. at 191.
210. See supra note 79.
211. Chemerinsky, supra note 119; Kent Fuchs, Personal Message from President Fuchs,
UNIV. FLA. (Oct. 10, 2017), http://statements.ufl.edu/statements/2017/10/statement-from-presi
dent-fuchs-about-richard-spencer-appearance.html; GUIDELINES FOR GOVERNING BOARDS, supra
note 8, at 1, 9–10; see, e.g., Spotlight 2018, supra note 124, at 7–8.
212. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Freedom of Speech at a Private Religious University, 2
UNIV. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 104, 105 (2008); but see Grutter’s First Amendment, supra
note 17, at 584. See also State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980) (holding that a private
university that committed, through its policies, to uphold broader standards of free speech than
were legally required of private universities, must comply with the standards it voluntarily
adopted).
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riums, the quadrangle, community bulletin boards) open for public use and
free expression all or some of the time.213
Despite widespread acceptance of this approach, constitutional juris-
prudence suggests it is flawed, or at least reflects an incomplete understand-
ing of applicable law214: for more than sixty years, the Court has accorded
greater weight and deference to university judgments in cases involving the
university marketplace than to other state actors in cases involving the pub-
lic marketplace.215 This deference has come to be understood as a constitu-
tional right of academic freedom for universities. The Court’s rationale for
granting deference has been less than clear. It appears to me that like the
Church, the Court recognizes that universities play a unique and essential
societal role that requires the continual management of competing interests.
Consequently, like the Church, the Court defers to universities to manage
these tensions in universities’ professional judgment, so long as they main-
tain fidelity to the institutional norms, and self-imposed individual norms,
that distinguish them from the public marketplace.
A. The Rise of Constitutional Academic Freedom
Constitutional academic freedom is rooted in the Court’s explicit rec-
ognition of academic freedom as a “special concern” of the First Amend-
ment.216 Academic freedom was first invoked by the Court in 1957, in a
concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,217 in which Justice Frank-
furter asserted that the truth-seeking role of faculty should be protected
from interference from “Church or State or any sectional interest.”218 Affir-
mations of academic freedom in Sweezy and subsequent decisions led some
scholars to suggest that this self-imposed norm of academia may be consti-
tutionally protected as a First Amendment right of individual faculty
members.219
But Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence did not focus only on individual
academic freedom. He also recognized universities’ need for institutional
213. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995); Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); see Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967 (8th Cir. 2006); supra notes
35–39 and accompanying text.
214. See Hanlon, supra note 148; No 1st Amendment Right, supra note 120; cf. Chemerinsky,
supra note 119.
215. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 363–64 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see Sweezy
v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
216. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978); Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (citations omitted).
217. 354 U.S. at 234. Sweezy considered a state attorney general’s demand that a public uni-
versity faculty member answer questions about his academic lectures and writings to examine his
possible connections to the Communist Party. The Court decided against the attorney general. Id.
218. Id. at 262.
219. Hutchens, supra note 107, at 1; Discipline and Freedom, supra note 19, at 204–05;
Emergence, supra note 43, at 793–96; Rabban, supra note 17, at 230; see Special Concern, supra
note 44, at 301.
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autonomy, identifying four freedoms he considered essential to universities’
ability to fulfill their educational missions in service of the common good:
For society’s good—if understanding be an essential need of soci-
ety—inquiries into [problems arising in the natural and social sci-
ences], speculations about them, stimulation in others of
reflection upon them, must be left as unfettered as possible. Polit-
ical power must abstain from intrusion into this activity of free-
dom, pursued in the interest of wise government and the people’s
well-being, except for reasons that are exigent and obviously
compelling.
. . . .
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere
which is most conducive to speculation, experiment, and creation.
It is an atmosphere in which there prevail “the four essential free-
doms” of a university—to determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study.220
While the majority in Sweezy did not rely on either individual or insti-
tutional academic freedom for its holding, courts at all levels have contin-
ued to invoke these essential freedoms to explain decisions favoring
universities in cases that uniquely affect the university marketplace.221
These outcomes led some scholars to assert that universities have their own
right to academic freedom (that is, a constitutional guarantee of institutional
autonomy), instead of or alongside faculty rights of individual academic
freedom.222 This theory was given greater credence by the Court’s 2003
majority opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger, which explicitly confirmed that
there is a “constitutional dimension, grounded in the First Amendment, of
educational autonomy”223 that justifies a Court “tradition of giving a degree
220. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 262–63 (citations omitted).
221. Johnson-Kurek v. Abu-Absi, 423 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 2005); Webb v. Bd. of Tr. of Ball
State Univ., 167 F.3d 1146 (7th Cir. 1999); Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Penn., 156 F.3d 488 (3d Cir.
1998); Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1982); see, e.g., Renken v. Gregory, 541
F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2008); cf. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 438 (“I have to hope that today’s majority does
not mean to imperil First Amendment protection of academic freedom in public colleges and
universities, whose teachers necessarily speak and write ‘pursuant to . . . official duties’”) (Souter,
J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
222. Emergence, supra note 43, at 794; Getting Real, supra note 61, at 929–30; Grutter’s First
Amendment, supra note 17, at 477–78; Special Concern, supra note 44, at 262; see Garcetti, 547
U.S. 410 (The idea that academic freedom may replace faculty rights under the First Amendment
assures faculty of broader speech freedoms than other government employees, but more con-
strained speech freedoms than the First Amendment guarantees outside academia.); see Rabban,
supra note 17, at 235–36, 256, 266. But see Richard H. Hiers, Institutional Academic Freedom - A
Constitutional Misconception: Did Grutter v. Bollinger Perpetuate the Confusion?, 30 J.C. & U.L.
531 (2004).
223. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978)).
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of deference to a university’s academic decisions, within constitutionally
prescribed limits.”224
B. A More Complete Theory of Constitutional Academic Freedom
After Grutter, most scholars agree that there is a constitutional right of
academic freedom or, at least, a public policy interest sufficient to justify
Court deference to universities in cases weighing regulation that uniquely
affects the university marketplace.225 However, the Court’s lack of clarity
in explaining its deference has led to considerable debate about why and the
extent to which such deference is constitutionally defensible.226
Most scholars (unsurprisingly, given that they are faculty members)
have rationalized the Court’s deference by reference to individual academic
freedom: They theorize that the Court will grant deference to “speech insti-
tutions” (like academia, the traditional press, or public libraries) whose mis-
sions or self-imposed norms primarily advance purposes the Court
considers to be closely aligned with First Amendment values, like truth-
seeking and knowledge promotion, which are primarily carried out by
faculty and thus justify protection.227 Or, they theorize, the Court grants
deference to such institutions because their institutional norms enable them
to facilitate the robustness of the marketplace of ideas more readily, at
224. Id. at 328.
225. DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 21; Emergence, supra
note 43, at 3–4; Getting Real, supra note 61, at 929; Goldberg & Sarabyn, supra note 17, at 220;
Hiers, supra note 222, at 532; Grutter’s First Amendment, supra note 17, at 461, 496; Nugent &
Flood, supra note 81, at 132; Rabban, supra note 17; Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional
First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256, 1270 (2005) [hereinafter Institutional First Amend-
ment]; Larry D. Spurgeon, A Transcendent Value: The Quest to Safeguard Academic Freedom, 34
J.C. & U.L. 111 (2007) [hereinafter Transcendent Value]; Why Bother, supra note 94; see Institu-
tions in the Marketplace, supra note 32. But see Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authori-
tarian Institutions, 32 SUFFOLK U.  L. REV. 441, 441 (1990).
226. DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 21; Emergence, supra
note 43, at 9; Getting Real, supra note 61, at 929; Goldberg & Sarabyn, supra note 17; Grutter’s
First Amendment, supra note 17, at 461; Nugent & Flood, supra note 81, at 132; Rabban, supra
note 17; Institutional First Amendment, supra note 225, at 1270; Transcendent Value, supra note
225, at 111; Why Bother, supra note 94. See generally Institutions in the Marketplace, supra note
32.
227. Rabban, supra note 17, at 231; Institutions in the Marketplace, supra note 32, at 822;
Discipline and Freedom, supra note 19, at 212; Emergence, supra note 43, at 8; Why Bother,
supra note 94, at 14; see Institutional First Amendment, supra note 225, at 1260, 1270; see also
Easy Answers, supra note 58, at 1545 (“[A]ssumptions that academic freedom is largely synony-
mous with institutional educational autonomy” is “surely encouraged by the courts, whose defense
of institutional autonomy for universities is generally closely linked to the value of academic
freedom.”). Scholars in this camp generally argue that Court deference should be limited to mat-
ters that implicate individual academic freedom or faculty members’ traditional academic func-
tions, to avoid abuse by university administrators. Citizen Servant, supra note 17, at 463–64;
Emergence, supra note 43, at 823–24; Goldberg & Sarabyn, supra note 17, at 221–23, 242–43;
Nugent & Flood, supra note 81; see, e.g., Rabban, supra note 17, at 235–37; see also Easy An-
swers, supra note 58, at 1542.
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lower cost, than the state (or in the case of public universities, other govern-
mental entities) can.228
These theories and arguments do not fully account for the decisions in
which the Court and lower courts have deferred to university judgments.229
Although they recognize universities’ need for autonomy to safeguard
scholars’ academic work, existing theories largely overlook universities’
need for autonomy to ensure that all of the universities’ pursuits align with
a customized educational mission that serves the common good, in the pub-
lic trust.230 It appears to me these oversights have contributed to an incom-
plete understanding of constitutional academic freedom. Reading the
Court’s decisions with a view to both the academic and public or charitable
facets of university identity reveals a more complete understanding of this
right.
The Court generally has granted deference to universities when it de-
termines their judgments231 are: (1) “academic,” “pedagogical,” or “educa-
tional” in nature;232 (2) consistent with the university’s “proper”
228. See Institutions in the Marketplace, supra note 32, at 846, 857–58.
229. If the Court’s deference to university judgments could be explained solely by reference to
the values served by individual academic freedom, the Court logically would defer to universities
only in matters that implicate individual academic freedom. In practice, the Court and lower
courts have granted deference to university judgments involving a broader range of matters. These
include: the selection and dismissal of students, see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 312 (1978); Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 214 (1985); the
selection and retention of faculty, see, e.g., Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir.
1987); control of the classroom curriculum, see Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Penn., 156 F.3d 488 (3d
Cir. 1998); the choice of faculty to teach a particular course, see Webb v. Bd. of Tr. of Ball State
Univ., 167 F.3d 1146, 1149 (7th Cir. 1999); the importance of student diversity to the fulfillment
of educational mission, see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); the germaneness of particu-
lar speech to educational objectives, see Southworth, 529 U.S. at 232 (“It is not for the Court to
say what is or is not germane to the ideas to be pursued in an institution of higher learning”);
universities’ authority to prohibit discrimination in co-curricular activities, see Christian Legal
Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010);
see generally Edward N. Stoner II & J. Michael Showalter, Judicial Deference to Educational
Judgment: Justice O’Connor’s Opinion in Grutter Reapplies Longstanding Principles, as Shown
by Rulings Involving College Students in the Eighteen Months Before Grutter, 30 J. C. & U. L.
583, 584 (2004); universities’ authority to restrict speech consistent with the standards of a profes-
sion or field in which students are being trained, see Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509
(Minn. 2012); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 908 (Mar. 10,
2003); and the appropriate use of university resources, see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,
278–79 (1981).
230. Grutter’s First Amendment, supra note 17, at 510; Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis.
Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 239 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring) (“[P]rotecting a university’s
discretion to shape its educational mission may prove to be an important consideration of First
Amendment analysis of objections to student fees.”).
231. My articulation of this framework relies in large part on Paul Horwitz’s analysis and
insights. See Grutter’s First Amendment, supra note 17.
232. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312; Martinez, 561 U.S. at 663, 685–86 (2010); Ewing, 474 U.S. at
225–28; Grutter’s First Amendment, supra note 17, at 492, 514–15; Goldberg & Sarabyn, supra
note 17, at 234, 252; see Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
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institutional or educational mission;233 (3) consistent with the university’s
community standards;234 (4) made after careful deliberation;235 and (5)
made in good faith, which is presumed absent evidence of the contrary (in-
cluding evidence of intentional viewpoint discrimination that is inconsistent
with universities’ self-imposed institutional norms and community stan-
dards that uphold those norms).236 Two of these elements (the academic
nature of the decision and avoidance of viewpoint discrimination) can be
explained by the unique contributions to market competitiveness, effi-
ciency, and idea valuation that result from universities’ academic identity.
The others reflect a more holistic understanding of universities’ obligations
as public or charitable academic organizations.
Specifically, the Court’s separate consideration of whether a univer-
sity’s judgment is both academic (or pedagogical or educational) and con-
sistent with its “proper” mission can be explained by universities’
obligation to advance an individualized mission that serves the common
good237—the basis for its public or charitable support.238 The Court’s inter-
est in ensuring that university judgments are consistent with their commu-
nity standards can be explained by universities’ obligation to operate in the
public trust.239 The Court’s consideration of whether universities engaged
in deliberation and the Court’s presumption of good faith (absent evidence
to the contrary) can be understood to demonstrate the Court’s recognition of
the fraught nature of university decision-making when an individual mar-
ketplace participant’s pursuit and promotion of particular ideas competes
with the university’s obligation to use its resources only to support the tai-
233. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312–14; Martinez,
561 U.S. at 684; Grutter’s First Amendment, supra note 17, at 499; see Grutter, 539 U.S. at 308,
340; cf. Goldberg & Sarabyn, supra note 17, at 234, 252.
234. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 274–77; Martinez, 561 U.S. at 686–90, 697; Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225,
227; Grutter’s First Amendment, supra note 17, at 490–91, 499; see Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315; see
also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 189 (1972).
235. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318–19; Martinez, 561 U.S. at 697; Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225, 227; see
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329.
236. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318–19; Martinez, 561 U.S. at 697; Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225, 227;
Grutter’s First Amendment, supra note 17, at 509, 572; Goldberg & Sarabyn, supra note 17, at
252–53; Neal H. Hutchens, Kristin Wilson & Jason Block, CLS v. Martinez and Competing Legal
Discourses Over the Appropriate Degree of Judicial Deference to the Co-Curricular Realm, 39
J.C. & U.L. 541, 553, 557 (2013); see Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329.
237. See Easy Answers, supra note 58, at 1547–49 (encouraging courts to “defer substantially
to universities’ own sense of what their academic mission requires” and suggesting it is reasonable
for universities to tailor their specific educational purposes based on the university’s own
judgments).
238. See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 96–106 and accompanying text; Bryce, supra note 96, at 114–15 (“[Pub-
lic t]rust is dependent in part on the success with which [a nonprofit organization’s] shared values
and common interests are projected or communicated.”); see also Easy Answers, supra note 58, at
1544 (suggesting that universities are unlikely to abuse their institutional autonomy in extreme
ways if they must explain such decisions by reference to their mission).
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lored purposes and environment that are consistent with its customized,
common-good community standards.240
In these situations, the Court has trusted universities to manage,
through the exercise of their professional judgment as educational adminis-
trators, what is inherently an institutional tension, so long as the decision
remains within the four corners of the university’s institutional obliga-
tions.241 The Court’s trust of universities under these circumstances helps
promote public trust, and it further facilitates that trust by incentivizing uni-
versities to maintain integrity with their known identities and standards.242
The Court’s approach suggests that it is equally or more concerned
with the maintenance of institutional integrity and public trust than with the
promotion, in any particular instance, of a competitive, efficient market-
place of ideas.243 The Court could consistently balance on the side of
speech, maintaining the primacy of First Amendment free speech guaran-
tees. Instead, it has held universities accountable for institutional integ-
rity.244 If universities expect the Court will hold them accountable to their
known community standards,245 they are more likely to clearly articulate
and maintain integrity with those standards.246 Institutional integrity drives
trust, and continued trust ensures that universities can continue to effec-
tively advance their common-good missions and thus serve important con-
stitutional interests.247
As I see it, promoting integrity and public trust in critical, national
institutions is a foundational purpose served by the Court. The smooth func-
240. See supra Part I.C.2; see also Grutter’s First Amendment, supra note 17, at 524 (post-
Grutter, “universities have substantial freedom to negotiate between [competing societal]
interests”).
241. See supra note 236 and accompanying text; Hutchens, Wilson & Block, supra note 236,
at 552 (noting that the Martinez dissent’s concern that there was “strong evidence in the record
that the policy was announced as a pretext” for viewpoint discrimination); Citizen Servant, supra
note 17, at 462–63 (noting that the Court’s decisions suggest deference is a rebuttable presump-
tion that “can be overcome when a faculty member shows that the institution has infringed her
First Amendment rights for reasons other than legitimate academic reasons.”); see also Grutter’s
First Amendment, supra note 17, at 508–09.
242. See supra notes 96–106 and accompanying text.
243. See Steve Leben, Public Trust and Confidence in the Courts: A National Conference and
Beyond, 36 CT. REV. 4 (Fall 1999); see David B. Rottman & Alan J. Tomkins, Public Trust and
Confidence in the Courts: What Public Opinion Surveys Mean to Judges, 36 CT. REV. 24 (Fall
1999); Robert Roberts, The Supreme Court and the Law of Public Service Ethics, PUB. INTEGRITY
20 (1999); Public Trust and Confidence, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS. (last updated March 30, 2018),
http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Court-Community/Public-Trust-and-Confidence/Resource-Guide.as
px; Purposes and Responsibilities of Courts, Public Trust and Confidence, NAT’L ASS’N FOR
COURT MGMT, https://nacmnet.org/CCCG/cccg_1_corecompetency_purposes_cg1.html.
244. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 231–242 and accompanying text.
246. Easy Answers, supra note 58, at 1544; see Grutter’s First Amendment, supra note 17, at
581.
247. Grutter’s First Amendment, supra note 17, at 501, 526, 549–50; see DEMOCRACY, EXPER-
TISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 21, at 61–93 (arguing that academic freedom contrib-
utes to the constitutional interest of democratic competence); Bryce, supra note 96, at 113.
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tioning of our democratic society is dependent on a web of nationally rec-
ognized institutions, like academia,248 whose purposes and norms advance
constitutional values that enable us to live in community.249 The erosion of
public trust in institutions is disruptive at best, fatal at worst. Individual
fatalities are frequently absorbed and overcome by society, but society’s
ability to withstand an institutional fatality is less clear to me. I suspect it is
no clearer to the Court. By following a decision-making approach that pre-
cisely maps the route to institutional integrity for institutions that uniquely
serve constitutional interests,250 the Court minimizes the risk of fatalities
and helps ensure the continued, smooth functioning of society—surely a
constitutional interest itself.251
Deferring to universities that maintain integrity with their known pur-
poses and norms also reflects a pragmatism demanded by the increasing
complexity and evolving nature of the university marketplace.252 In the de-
cades since Sweezy, universities have diversified,253 and the cost of the edu-
cation they offer has increased dramatically.254 Competition for students
has increased, too, and despite their common institutional standards, each
university must distinguish its educational value proposition or risk losing
market share.255 A small number of U.S. universities face greater demand
than their resources can support, most others cannot fill their seats,256 and
248. These institutions are both governmental (like Congress or the judiciary) and non-gov-
ernmental (like academia, organized religion, libraries, or the press). See, e.g., Grutter’s First
Amendment, supra note 17, at 570.
249. Balancing Free Speech, supra note 16, at 18, 21–22; Participatory Democracy, supra
note 31, at 624; Why Bother, supra note 94, at 12–16; see Institutions in the Marketplace, supra
note 32, at 840–41.
250. For examples of cases suggesting the Court’s deference to universities could be repli-
cated for other institutions, see Grutter’s First Amendment, supra note 17, at 570–71.
251. See Participatory Democracy, supra note 31, at 627 (“The most fundamental problem of
any constitutional order is how to establish stable forms of social ordering, a value that democracy
uniquely facilitates and that does not entail further systematic commitments to individual
autonomy.”).
252. See Grutter’s First Amendment, supra note 17, at 573; cf. id. at 471 (The Court’s use of
“generally applicable principles, such as neutrality and equality, as its guiding principles in First
Amendment jurisprudence . . . blind the Court to the real-world context in which many speech acts
take place.”).
253. See supra note 100.
254. See id.
255. Eric Hoover, Marketing to Survive, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 29, 2016), https://
www.chronicle.com/article/Marketing-to-Survive/235460; see, e.g., Greg Summers, Back to the
Future at Stevens Point, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/arti
cle/Back-to-the-Future-at-Stevens/242978.
256. See, e.g., Farran Powell, How Competitive Is College Admissions?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/articles/2016-09-22/how-
competitive-is-college-admissions.
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all are experiencing rapid shifts in students’ academic demands,257 requir-
ing the careful and efficient management of university resources.258
In addition to these challenges, the boundaries around the university
marketplace have dissolved. University marketplace participants regularly
communicate ideas bound up with universities’ expanding educational pro-
grams, policies, and activities through speech forums (like social media ser-
vices and privately maintained websites) that are outside the university’s
borders and control.259 An unexpected tweet can quickly transfer private
speech to a designated or public forum, shining a spotlight on the univer-
sity.260 A single social media post can, within hours or minutes, mobilize a
“flash mob” campus protest that can be broadcast globally in an instant,
requiring an immediate response from both the university’s public safety
and public relations departments.261 Modern speech forums operate twenty-
four hours a day and have few effective mechanisms to enforce standards of
participation (if they maintain standards at all).
In this environment, there is heightened potential for individual mar-
ketplace participants to seriously and unpredictably disrupt a university’s
ability to allocate resources in the manner it judges to best advance its com-
mon-good educational mission.262 There also is heightened potential for the
actions of a single marketplace participant, and the university’s response to
that participant, to raise public suspicion that a university is not effectively
advancing its common-good mission, regardless of the facts. This rapidly
evolving speech environment demands a constitutional decision-making
framework that is consistently applicable to new speech forms and fo-
rums.263 The framework must acknowledge universities’ obligation to focus
257. See, e.g., Eric Hayot, The Humanities as We Know Them Are Doomed. Now What?,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 1, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/The-Humanities-as-We-
Know-Them/243769.
258. Davidson, supra note 102; Doug Lederman, Leading in Turbulent Times: A Survey of
Presidents, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/survey/
survey-college-presidents-finds-worry-about-public-attitudes-confidence-finances (noting that re-
cent college mergers, closures, and tuition resets “hint at a recognition by campus leaders that the
financial pressures on their institutions is a permanent condition rather than a lingering result of
the Great Recession”); see, e.g., Summers, supra note 255.
259. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., McAdams v. Marquette Univ.,
914 N.W.2d 708 (Wis. 2018); Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012).
260. See Beckie Supiano, What Happens in the Classroom No Longer Stays in the Classroom.
What Does That Mean for Teaching?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 19, 2018), https://
www.chronicle.com/article/What-Happens-in-the-Classroom/243974.
261. See Michael Edison Hayden, Richard Spencer: Prepare for More White Nationalist
Flash Mobs, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.newsweek.com/richard-spencer-prepare-
more-white-nationalist-flash-mobs-681242.
262. See also Freedom of Speech and the University, supra note 35, at 27 (“All government
institutions established to achieve particular goals must regulate speech as necessary to achieve
those goals, on pain of becoming ineffective.”).
263. See also Easy Answers, supra note 58, at 1512. A move away from ad hoc balancing in
decisions affecting the university marketplace is consistent with the Court’s general move away
from ad hoc balancing and towards categorical balancing, in an effort to reduce the opportunity
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resources as they judge to best advance their customized missions, within
the context of institutional obligations.264
A framework that defers to universities that maintain institutional in-
tegrity with their known purposes and norms meets these demands. In an
unbounded communication and educational environment, it offers better
predictive value to universities, their stakeholders, and the lower courts than
the old balancing construct of forum analysis and time, place, and manner
restrictions.265 It also reflects faculty interests: if a university is appropri-
ately upholding the academic norm of shared governance, then all of its
community standards should reflect faculty input or approval to the extent
its shared governance system requires it.266 Accordingly, by trusting univer-
sities only when their judgments are consistent with their community stan-
dards, the Court effectively grants as much deference to the university’s
faculty as it grants to the university itself.267
Universities’ right of constitutional academic freedom reflects the
Court’s understanding—conscious or not—that to preserve public trust in
universities, universities must retain sufficient freedom to manage institu-
tional tensions using their own professional judgment, so long as they exer-
cise that judgment in good faith.268 The Court has demonstrated that it will
for courts to exercise subjective judgments. Balancing Free Speech, supra note 16; see generally
Post-Liberal Judging, supra note 24.
264. See supra notes 94–106 and accompanying text.
265. While this integrity-based framework would provide more consistent guidance than ad
hoc balancing given the unpredictable nature of new speech forms and forums, in practice the
outcomes of this framework should generally be consistent with forum analysis outcomes (at least
where the speech forum is readily recognizable to university administrators), because forum anal-
ysis also is dependent on the university’s clear articulation (through policy statements) of and
demonstrated compliance (through customary practice) with the intended purpose and rules gov-
erning the forum. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802–03
(1985). Moreover, even public universities never have been obligated to open the university mar-
ketplace to public speech. See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text. The outcomes of this
integrity-based decision-making framework also would be consistent with the holding in a private
university case in which the university committed, through its policies, to uphold broader stan-
dards of free speech than, as a private university, it was required to uphold; in that case, the
university sought deference from the courts on the grounds of institutional autonomy and was
rejected because its decision was inconsistent with its policy. See State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615
(N.J. 1980). Of course, the challenge for any university that has opened campus speech forums for
public participation and later wishes to restrict them is how best to shift course. I think it is as
simple as changing policy. See Gerlich v. Leath, 861 F.3d 697 (8th Cir. 2017). Admittedly, chang-
ing policy in the university context is easier said than done due to shared governance obligations
and the possibility that faculty, students, and other university stakeholders will strongly resist
changes that seem inconsistent with their own interests and their perception of university obliga-
tions. Changes in policy that would tighten the university’s focus and resources on core educa-
tional activities, with accompanying benefits to students and faculty, seem more likely to garner
support than changes that simply eliminate the use of the forum for public purposes.
266. See supra notes 79–83 and accompanying text.
267. See Julian N. Eule & Jonathan D. Varat, Transporting First Amendment Norms to the
Private Sector: With Every Wish There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1537, 1617–18 (1998);
Easy Answers, supra note 58, at 1533–34; Grutter’s First Amendment, supra note 17, at 566.
268. See supra Part I.C.2.
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not second-guess these judgments unless they appear likely to erode public
trust in universities, individually or collectively.
C. The Proper Scope of Constitutional Academic Freedom
Since Grutter, the Court and lower courts have not consistently in-
voked constitutional academic freedom to explain their deference to univer-
sities,269 contributing to confusion about this right.270 Cases that apply the
Court’s decision-making framework, despite failing to reference constitu-
tional academic freedom, can help clarify its proper scope and application.
Two key Minnesota student speech cases illustrate this.271
In Keefe v. Adams,272 the Eighth Circuit affirmed the summary judg-
ment dismissal of a nursing student’s First Amendment claim contesting his
removal from a community college nursing program based on his social
media posts.273 The court concluded that a professional school’s administra-
tors have discretion to require compliance with recognized professional
standards both on and off campus,274 so long as the restriction is not “a
pretext for viewpoint, or any other kind of discrimination.”275 The court
affirmed that the professional nursing code of ethics was a legitimate part of
the academic program curriculum; thus, noncompliance with the code
“‘materially disrupts’ the program’s ‘legitimate pedagogical concerns’”
and could be disciplined.276
269. Goldberg & Sarabyn, supra note 17, at 219; Citizen Servant, supra note 17, at 408, 459;
see Rabban, supra note 17, at 235–37.
270. Grutter’s First Amendment, supra note 17; see Goldberg & Sarabyn, supra note 17, at
222. See generally Getting Real, supra note 61.
271. The holdings in these cases, Keefe v. Adams and Tatro v. University of Minnesota, relied
on the same decision-making framework the Court has applied to justify deference to university
judgments. In each case, the university was managing a tension between speech freedoms in the
university marketplace and the university’s customized, common-good educational mission (train-
ing students for a profession). It made an academic decision, after deliberation and apparently in
good faith, that was consistent with its customized mission and other known community stan-
dards, which were consistent with academic norms and the university’s obligation, as a public
university, to steward its resources consistent with its common-good mission. See Keefe v. Ad-
ams, 840 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 2016); Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012); supra
notes 75, 94–106, 231–242 and accompanying text.
272. 840 F.3d 523.
273. See id.
274. The court noted that “[m]any courts have upheld enforcement of academic requirements
of professionalism and fitness.” Id. at 530; Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850, 866–68 (9th
Cir. 2015); Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 733–34 (6th Cir. 2012); Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664
F.3d 865, 875–76 (11th Cir. 2011); Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 734–35 (7th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 546 U.S. 1169 (2006); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1286–90 (10th Cir.
2004); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 947–49 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 908 (2003).
275. Keefe, 840 F.3d at 530 (“If compliance with professional ethical standards is a permissi-
ble academic requirement, then determinations of non-compliance will almost always be based at
least in part on a student’s speech.”).
276. Id. at 531.
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The court rejected the student’s claim that it would violate the First
Amendment to discipline off-campus speech that is not in an unprotected
category of speech; it stated that a “student may demonstrate an unaccept-
able lack of professionalism off campus, as well as in the classroom, and by
speech as well as conduct.”277 To explain its holding, the court cited Re-
gents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing (“Considerations of profound
importance counsel restrained judicial review of the substance of academic
decisions”278) and the Sixth Circuit in Ward v. Polite (“When a university
lays out a program’s curriculum or class’s requirement for all to see, it is
the rare day when a student can exercise a First Amendment veto over
them.”279). The student’s petition for certiorari was denied.
In Tatro v. University of Minnesota,280 the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that a university could restrict a mortuary student’s social media posts
containing disrespectful comments about the donated cadavers students
worked on in class, because the posts violated established professional con-
duct standards of the mortuary profession requiring deceased bodies to be
treated with dignity and respect.281 The court granted “deference to the cur-
riculum decisions of the University” and concluded that “the academic pro-
gram rules imposed on Tatro . . . are directly related to established
professional conduct standards” and “narrowly tailored.”282
Keefe and Tatro confirm that it is a proper academic decision to hold
students accountable to the established standards of a professional disci-
pline in which they are being trained, and to hold students accountable for
off-campus speech that implicates curricular obligations and legitimate ped-
agogical concerns.283 A logical application of this conclusion is that univer-
sities may hold all students accountable for off-campus speech in
accordance with the professional standards of academic disciplines in
which they are being trained, which include the responsibilities of academic
freedom.284 Academic freedom responsibilities extend to scholars’ expres-
sion and writing as citizens, because “the public may judge their profession
and their institution by their utterances.”285 In today’s high-stakes commu-
nication environment,286 it seems reasonable to hold students accountable
for extramural utterances that violate community standards in ways that im-
277. Id.
278. Id. at 533 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225–26 (1985)).
279. Id. at 532 (citing Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 734 (6th Cir. 2012)).
280. Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012).
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. See supra notes 235–41, 273–76, 280–81 and accompanying text.
284. Holding students accountable to academic freedom would appear to place more con-
straints on their speech than the Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students. See STU-
DENT RIGHTS, supra note 78; cf. 1940 STATEMENT, supra note 70. See also Kaplin & Lee, supra
note 78, at 852–53.
285. 1940 STATEMENT, supra note 70, at 14; see also supra note 70.
286. See supra notes 259–64 and accompanying text.
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plicate perceptions of university integrity, regardless of whether the state-
ments are governed by the academic rules of a specific course,287 so long as
each other component of the Court’s decision-making framework has been
satisfied.288
If universities can regulate off-campus speech of faculty and students,
it seems logical that universities also could regulate the on-campus speech
of outside speakers whose speech may implicate university integrity, so
long as the Court’s decision-making framework has been satisfied.289 This
means universities would be required to notify invited speakers, in advance,
of any standards they must uphold if they accept the invitation to speak.290
V. A CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY APPROACH TO CAMPUS SPEECH AND
UNIVERSITY IDENTITY
Campus speech tensions can ignite from myriad sparks: external
speakers and messaging campaigns that touch the campus;291 personal ac-
tions and interactions of university community members;292 and administra-
tive choices.293 Ultimately, these tensions all arise from individuals’
differing perceptions about the interests the university is expected to serve,
and how it can best serve them. The work of Catholic universities, and the
Court’s past decisions, demonstrate that universities need not manage these
tensions by trading off one essential element of university identity for an-
other. Through the exercise of constitutional academic freedom, all univer-
sities can effectively hold the tension of free speech, inclusive diversity, and
287. If universities hold their students to the same academic freedom responsibilities as apply
to faculty, then they also should follow the same controlling principle for responding to violations
of those responsibilities as apply to faculty, resorting to dismissal only if the expression “clearly
demonstrates . . . unfitness” to serve in a faculty or student role, taking their entire record into
account. 1940 STATEMENT, supra note 70, at 15 (quoting EXTRAMURAL UTTERANCES, supra note
75, at 31); see also supra note 70.
288. See supra notes 75, 94–106 and accompanying text; 1940 STATEMENT, supra note 70; see
also Freedom of Speech and the University, supra note 35, at 25–26 (“The fact that universities
are . . . reaching out to regulate offr-campus [sic] behavior suggests that they in fact do believe
that it somehow relates to their educational mission.”).
289. See also No 1st Amendment Right, supra note 120.
290. Universities could hold outside speakers accountable to universities’ community stan-
dards, the professional norms of the speaker’s own profession, or a hybrid or modified form of
either, depending on the purpose of the speech and the profession of the speaker.
291. See, e.g., Cohen supra note 6; Scott Jaschik, Confronting ‘It’s OK to Be White,’ INSIDE
HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/11/05/campuses-con
front-spread-its-ok-be-white-posters.
292. See, e.g., Under Fire, supra note 124; McAdams v. Marquette Univ., 914 N.W.2d 708
(Wis. 2018).
293. See, e.g., Thomason & Johnson, supra note 7; Monica Wang & Susan Svrluga, Yale
Renames Calhoun College Because of Historical Ties to White Supremacy and Slavery, WASH.
POST (Feb. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/02/11/yale-
renames-calhoun-college-because-of-historic-ties-to-white-supremacy-and-slavery/?utm_term=.5c
959ddb64b0.
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their distinctive institutional and individual identities, by applying five les-
sons from the Catholic university experience.
A. Renew the Institutional Vision for Modern Universities by Clearly
Defining Their Fundamental Purposes, Essential
Characteristics, and Norms
University presidents believe that the public does not understand the
purpose of higher education.294 If this is true, the fault lies primarily with
the institution. Academia last articulated a collective vision in 1915,295 at a
time when university communities were largely homogenous,296 with fixed
boundaries around their campuses and comparatively few platforms for in-
dividual expression. Over the past century, the educational landscape has
grown significantly more complex.297 Today’s universities have a deeper
understanding of the full range of needs of a highly diverse society, and
they know more about what it takes to ensure an effective educational envi-
ronment for all students who wish to learn.298 Norms are evolving to reflect
this new knowledge299 but universities’ messaging is out of sync.300 They
have failed to effectively communicate and demonstrate how they can serve
the interests of all of their stakeholders with integrity.301 Declining public
trust in universities and the prevalence of campus speech tensions suggest
that universities cannot resolve this issue simply by ramping up communi-
cations that reinforce the same themes universities have relied on in the
past. U.S. universities must look to the future and establish their own Ex
294. 2018 GALLUP SURVEY, supra note 18, at 23 (“Over all, 13 percent of presidents strongly
agree or agree, while 56 percent strongly disagree, that Americans have an accurate view of the
purpose of higher education.”).
295. 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 52. Since 1915, academic associations have published
many policy statements that more fully address individual interests first articulated in the 1915
Declaration, with widespread support across the academy. See, e.g., REDBOOK, supra note 58.
These policy statements may reference particular elements of university identity, but none offers a
comprehensive, institutional vision for universities. See id. The AACU Statement on Free Expres-
sion, Liberal Education, and Inclusive Excellence takes steps in this direction, but it is limited to
universities focused on “liberal education” and does not offer the same type of concrete imple-
menting guidance as Ex Corde. See AACU Statement, supra note 78.
296. Cf. R. George Wright, Campus Speech and the Functions of the University, 43 J.C. &
U.L. 1, 9 (2017).
297. See supra notes 9–15 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 134–38 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 132–40 and accompanying text.
300. See supra Part II.
301. See id. University governing authorities recognize their challenges: The Association of
Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges, which focuses on university governance, began
an initiative in 2017 to synchronize messaging of university trustees, designed “to involve [them]
in countering growing skepticism about the value of higher education.” The Guardians Initiative
Aims to Reclaim Public Trust in Higher Education, ASS’N OF GOVERNING BOARDS, https://
www.agb.org/guardians (last visited Feb. 1, 2019). Their research briefs address topics including
“The Promise of Higher Education,” “Public Confidence in Higher Education,” and “Renewing
the Democratic Purposes of Higher Education,” among others. Id. at https://www.agb.org/guardi
ans/learn. However, these efforts are limited in scope and ad hoc in execution. See id.
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Corde, a renewed, shared vision of what it means to be a university in the
modern world.
Universities’ vision must clearly articulate the indispensable purposes
that modern universities serve, their essential characteristics, and the norms
they are expected to uphold to retain their distinctive public or charitable
academic identity.302 Without an authoritative  articulation of the frame-
work that applies across all U.S. universities, there can be no common ex-
pectations against which stakeholders can assess whether universities meet
their institutional obligations with integrity.303 The lack of a well-defined
framework also makes it easier for universities to shirk accountability.
In the case of Catholic universities, the visioning process was initiated
by influential leaders in Catholic higher education, with the final vision
articulated by the Church. Unless U.S. universities are prepared to defer to
Congress, they must complete the process themselves.  Influential univer-
sity and academic association leaders could initiate this work, building on
ad hoc trust-building efforts that already are underway within pockets of the
academy.304 The process could be iterative, beginning with a small group
and then expanding to representatives from across academia, with opportu-
nities for input from individual university communities and key external
stakeholders. When the process is complete, academic associations and in-
dividual universities could be asked to make a public commitment to em-
brace and publicize their renewed institutional vision. If universities fail to
establish an institution-wide framework, reflecting university and key stake-
302. See Easy Answers, supra note 58, at 1546, 1549 (noting that academia “has long debated
the very purpose of higher education” and encouraging dialogue “within and between universities
about their educational missions and about the meaning of academic freedom.”); Freedom of
Speech and the University, supra note 35, at 22–30. While the relative values of free speech and
inclusive diversity are important aspects of this vision, they are only a piece of university identity
and mission that requires greater clarity. See Peter Monaghan, How Academe Can Retrieve Its
Good Name, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 25, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/How-
Academe-Can-Retrieve-Its/245154 (“The standing of higher education is in peril, so ‘we now
need to make explicit the terms of the partnership’”) (quoting from Holden Thorp & Buck Gold-
stein, OUR HIGHER CALLING, REBUILDING THE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN AMERICA AND ITS COL-
LEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (2018)).
303. It could be argued, perhaps, that higher education accreditation standards provide a com-
mon framework for measurement, but these standards are inconsistent across the country, and they
do not require demonstrated integrity with any particular purposes or values. Moreover, ac-
creditors are focused on quality assurance based on the accreditor’s understanding of the purpose
of higher education institutions; accreditors do not establish that purpose. Guiding Values, HIGHER
LEARNING COMM’N, https://www.hlcommission.org/Publications/guiding-values.html; see, e.g.,
Accreditation Serving the Public Interest, COUNCIL FOR HIGHER EDUC. ACCREDITATION (Aug.
2015), http://www.chea.org/userfiles/uploads/chea-at-a-glance_2015.pdf. While some higher edu-
cation associations have developed principles that apply to their own members, see AACU State-
ment on Inclusive Excellence, supra note 78, AACU Statement on Diversity, supra note 134;
AAU Statement on Academic Principles, supra note 89, no association has articulated comprehen-
sively all of the academic norms and values essential to reputable standing in academia. ACE
Statement, supra note 100; see also Easy Answers, supra note 58, at 1546, 1549.
304. See supra notes 295, 301, 303.
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holder input and dialogue, external authorities may impose their own vision
and rules.305
B. Commit to Hold the Tension of Essential Interests, Within the
Confines of Truth and the Common Good
Catholic universities manage the tension of Catholic and university us-
ing the same tools available to all universities: they make value judgments,
through the exercise of academic freedom and institutional autonomy, about
what is truth, what truth deserves promotion as knowledge, and whether
particular truth-seeking and knowledge-promotion pursuits advance the
common good in ways that effectively serve student and societal needs in
light of available resources.306 But Catholic university leaders and the
Church understood that to realize the full potential of Catholic universities,
these value judgments cannot result in an imbalance or compromise of ei-
ther interest; both elements are essential to their identity, and a clear touch-
stone would be required to gauge whether Catholic universities’ value
judgments effectively hold these interests in tension. The touchstone estab-
lished by Ex Corde is simple, compelling, and meets the needs of both
university and Church: Catholic universities must assess their ideas and
pursuits based on whether they preserve human dignity, as defined by the
Church, and “create and support institutions that improve the conditions of
human life.”307
Today, there is no clear touchstone that guides the value judgments of
universities institution-wide when managing tensions between competing
305. Some lawmakers have begun such efforts already. See, e.g., FOUND. FOR INDIVID-
UAL RIGHTS IN EDUC., INC., Florida Becomes Ninth State to Ban Restrictive Campus Free Speech
Zones (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.thefire.org/florida-becomes-ninth-state-to-ban-restrictive-cam
pus-free-speech-zones/; Tyler Coward, Louisiana Governor Signs Campus Free Speech Bill into
Law; Law Needs Technical Improvement, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EDUC., INC. (June 6,
2018), https://thefire.org/louisiana-governor-signs-campus-free-speech-bill-into-law-law-needs-
technical-improvemnet/; William Petroski, Should Iowa Abolish Faculty Tenure at State Universi-
ties?, DES MOINES REGISTER (updated Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.desmoinsregister.com/story/
news/politics/2018/01/18/should-iowa-abolish-faculty-tenure-state-universities/1043576001/; Col-
leen Flaherty, Killing Tenure, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.
com/news/2017/01/13/legislation-two-states-seeks-eliinate-tenure-public-higher-education.
306. See Baxter, supra note 102, at 634 (“[A]ll institutions of higher learning operate accord-
ing to a scale of values that defines and thereby limits academic freedom. What is different about
the Catholic institutions—at least the ones patterned after the vision of [Ex Corde]—is that they
are more explicit, more forthright and honest, about their scale of values, which the pope sums up
in the phrase ‘truth and common good.’”). See also supra Part I.C.
307. Catechism, supra note 137, at Section 1926. In Catholic teaching, improving the condi-
tions of human life does not exclude interests in the preservation of non-human life; these interests
are mutually supportive. See id. at Section 2415 (“The seventh commandment enjoins respect for
the integrity of creation. Animals, like plants and inanimate beings, are by nature destined for the
common good of past, present, and future humanity. . . . Man’s dominion over inanimate and
other living beings granted by the Creator is not absolute; it is limited by concern for the quality of
life of his neighbor, including generations to come; it requires a religious respect for the integrity
of creation.” (citations omitted)).
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interests. Moreover, there is no clarity about the values they should
weigh.308 Although many university marketplace participants have identi-
fied inclusive diversity as an essential value, the institution has failed to
assign it weight,309 making it harder for individual universities to do so.
Ambiguity about institutional values encourages a lack of transparency be-
cause it is unclear whether particular value judgments are within institu-
tional bounds. Universities, thus, continue to imbalance or compromise
essential values in haphazard fashion without explanation, rather than hold-
ing them in tension in a way that stakeholders can understand.310
As a result of these shortcomings and the gap between stakeholder
expectations and the outcomes of academia’s value judgments, many stake-
holders no longer trust academia’s self-regulatory system to reveal
truth311—the foundational purpose of the university marketplace. If univer-
sities are no longer trusted as a societal source of truth, there is no constitu-
tional reason to distinguish them from the public marketplace through the
grant of individual or institutional academic freedom. If universities care to
continue their special role in society, they must define their confines of
truth and the common good with greater precision, in ways that give stake-
holders greater confidence that universities’ collective pursuits advance
public interests.
An indisputable truth of the university marketplace is that over the past
century, it has failed to effectively engage the full diversity of prospective
offerors, such that the marketplace is less competitive and efficient than
intended.312 Recent campus speech tensions have focused on universities’
under-engagement of participants distinguished by race and ethnicity.313
There is evidence that universities also have under-engaged some partici-
pants distinguished by socioeconomic status and political persuasion.314
Universities could better serve the full range of prospective participants and
societal interests by holding the tension of inclusive diversity and free
308. See supra Part II.B.1.
309. See supra Part II.B.2.
310. See supra Part II.B.
311. See Michiko Kakutani, ‘The Death of Expertise’ Explores How Ignorance Became a
Virtue, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/21/books/the-death-of-ex
pertise-explores-how-ignorance-became-a-virtue.html.
312. See supra notes 135–46 and accompanying text; supra Part I.C.1.
313. See supra notes 135–46, 163.
314. See, e.g., Some Colleges Have More Students from the Top 1 Percent than the Bottom 60.
Find Yours., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/01/18/upshot/
some-colleges-have-more-students-from-the-top-1-percent-than-the-bottom-60.html; Scott Jas-
chik, Professors and Politics: What the Research Says, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 27, 2017),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/02/27/research-confirms-professors-lean-left-ques
tions-assumptions-about-what-means; Kim Phillips-Fein, How the Right Learned to Loathe
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speech within similar confines as apply to Catholic universities by making
value judgments about truth and the common good based on whether partic-
ular ideas or pursuits preserve human dignity (however they wish to define
it) and improve the communal conditions of human life. These are content-
neutral objectives that are consistent with both institutional obligations and
constitutional interests,315 and they provide universities and their stakehold-
ers with clear boundaries and direction that still allow ample room for cus-
tomization by individual universities.
C. Clearly and Precisely Articulate an Individualized Mission and
Other Community Standards Within the Common, Institutional
Framework
Higher education accreditors generally require universities to articulate
their missions;316 however, regional accreditors vary in their documented
expectations beyond a general requirement to state the university’s pur-
pose.317 While accreditors may identify specific topics that must be ad-
dressed, none requires a university’s mission to contain any particular
characteristic or value that would mark the organization as a university.318
This allows universities to be imprecise about the purposes, values, and
norms that guide them.319 In contrast, Ex Corde requires Catholic universi-
ties to precisely articulate their individualized mission and norms, including
a public statement identifying the university as Catholic.320 These obliga-
tions guarantee that Catholic universities will also be clear and transparent
about the university component of their identity and its implications; other-
wise, stakeholders might assume that Catholic universities are less commit-
ted to their academic obligations than to their Catholicity.
Universities that operate without deliberately developed and carefully
articulated purposes, values, and norms will eventually run into trouble. In
today’s environment, university decisions are easily scrutinized by anyone
with access to the Internet. Decisions that cannot be explained by reference
to known standards are easily challenged by energized stakeholders who
disagree with the decision. If, instead, the university can point to specific
community standards that clearly demonstrate the integrity of its decisions,
the focus shifts from whether its decision was appropriate, to whether the
community standard that motivates it is appropriate. That is a more funda-
mental question, and it keeps the focus at the right level: high.
Using a shared governance process that includes substantial and mean-
ingful faculty engagement, universities should ensure that their customized
315. See supra notes 137, 247–51.
316. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
317. See id.
318. See id.
319. See Freedom of Speech and the University, supra note 35, at 22–30.
320. See supra notes 197–200 and accompanying text.
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community standards within their control are rigorously determined and
precisely articulated, within the parameters of universities’ common institu-
tional framework. These standards should guide the creation of every uni-
versity policy, decision, and stakeholder communication.321
D. Encourage and Welcome Accountability
Ex Corde has been effective in part because it is directed, explicitly, to
every person with an interest in Catholic universities, encouraging their ac-
tive support for Catholic universities’ work to fulfill their missions, and
providing standards of measurement that empower stakeholders to hold
Catholic universities accountable.322 The prospect of accountability incen-
tivizes Catholic universities to seek to convert competition into cooperation.
This incentive is reinforced through Ex Corde’s express expectation that
university leaders will engage in intentional and ongoing collaborative dia-
logue with key stakeholders concerned with competing interests—most no-
tably their local Church authorities.323 By directly engaging stakeholders to
discuss how to hold the tension of Catholic and university under the princi-
ples of Ex Corde, Catholic universities give themselves the best opportunity
to achieve the full potential of their unified identity and mission. Active
accountability fosters apparent integrity.
Universities cannot reasonably expect effective stakeholder support or
engagement if expectations are unaligned and the standards of measurement
are unclear. When universities have assured themselves of the necessary
clarity of their vision, they should seek to foster collaborative, ongoing rela-
tionships and dialogues with key internal and external stakeholders across
the spectrum, with a view to building and sustaining alignment of expecta-
tions and creatively considering the best ways for universities to integrate
their competing interests as the educational environment and societal needs
evolve.
E. Engage in Continuous, Intentional Efforts to Maintain the Tension
Catholic universities continually focus on holding the tension of their
essential, competing interests, staying attuned as the component forces shift
321. Groups of universities that share some defining characteristics, such as public research
universities, vocational colleges, community colleges, or liberal arts colleges, might choose to
collectively define a subset of purposes, values, and norms that guide the individualized standards
of all universities in their respective category, like Catholic universities have done through Ex
Corde. The AACU Statement on Free Expression, Liberal Education, and Inclusive Excellence is
an example of how subgroups of universities might offer a more specific vision for their category
of universities within the broader institutional framework; however, the AACU Statement offers
less concrete guidance than Ex Corde. See AACU Statement on Inclusive Excellence, supra note
78. More concrete expectations would provide better guidance to these universities and their
stakeholders.
322. See supra Part III.C.
323. See supra notes 201–02 and accompanying text.
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and surge. Universities must do the same. While universities would benefit
from a single institutional framework, there is no single path individual uni-
versities must follow to effectively hold the tension of free speech and in-
clusive diversity on a day-to-day basis. Each university must choose the
way that works best for its particular university community and culture. I
offer guiding principles:
• Be intentional. Consider how each university program, activ-
ity, investment, policy, decision, and communication, at every
level, preserves human dignity and improves community con-
ditions, both within and outside of your university market-
place, consistent with your individualized community
standards. As your customized purposes, values, and resources
evolve, acknowledge their evolution and re-value as needed.
• Regularly evaluate existing policies and resource allocations
with a specific view to integrity with institutional obligations
and individual mission and values. Re-focus your policies and
resources around mission advancement, your documented val-
ues, and intended outcomes. When practicable, empower com-
munity members to exercise judgment within these
parameters, rather than establishing formalistic rules, with the
expectation of accountability for judgments that violate com-
munity standards. This approach requires standards to be ar-
ticulated clearly, but not exhaustively.
• Hold both the university and individual community members
accountable for maintaining and promoting integrity with
community standards. Be transparent about choices and ratio-
nales. Where hard decisions are required, test them first by
asking a range of influential community members whether the
decision has integrity with the university’s identity or how it
can be made with integrity. If there is no consensus, go back
to the drawing board.
Public universities may be nervous about holding the tension of free
speech and inclusive diversity outside the bounds of specific course curric-
ula.324 The Court’s decisions suggest that the best defense to these concerns
is to ensure a clear, documented link between the activity in which speech
is regulated and specific educational objectives the university considers to
be essential to its educational value proposition.325 It is not unusual for
today’s universities to seek to achieve specified educational outcomes
through the design of co-curricular, extra-curricular, and student housing
programs and facilities.326 So long as the university is intentional about
324. See supra notes 283–88 and accompanying text.
325. See supra Parts IV.B and IV.C.
326. See, e.g., Lawrence Biemiller, What’s New in Freshman Housing? Buildings that Help
Students Make Friends, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.chronicle.com/article/
What-s-New-in-Freshman/240864 (describing how the design of student housing contributes to
improved student retention); Scott Carlson, Is It a Library? A Student Center? The Athenaeum
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those objectives, narrowly tailors speech regulations to meet them, clearly
documents both the objectives and the regulations, and makes them known
to its community members, the Court’s past decision-making framework
suggests it would defer to the university’s judgment.327
Contrast a university’s regulation of speech in facilities that primarily
support mission advancement through the generation of increased operating
revenue (for example, facilities primarily used by third parties for events
not sponsored by the university). Unless the university can directly link the
activities in these facilities to specific educational objectives, it would be
more difficult for the university to defend the regulation of speech in those
forums, which are distinguished from the public marketplace only by refer-
ence to the use of the revenue they generate and their location on the uni-
versity campus. Requiring all events in those forums to meet minimum
educational criteria and engage a minimum number of attendees from the
university community might justify speech regulation in the forum consis-
tent with the university’s community standards. Or, the university might
justify speech regulation only in events in those forums that meet the educa-
tional and community attendance criteria.
It may be helpful to remember that in today’s marketplace of ideas, all
prospective participants have “ample alternative channels for communica-
tion” of the ideas they wish to test and promote.328 Universities best main-
tain their distinctions from the public marketplace by maintaining higher
standards for participation,329 in accordance with value-based judgments
guided by a clear vision of what it means for universities to pursue truth-
seeking and knowledge-promotion that serves the common good.330 The
diversity of universities today is staggering;331 even with a common institu-
tional vision, individual universities will be distinguished by their custom-
ized community standards. Individuals who do not wish to be subjected to
the customized standards of a particular university need not join that mar-
ketplace.332 If individuals seriously exercise their freedom to choose, over
Opens at Goucher College, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 14, 2009), https://www.chronicle.com/
article/Is-It-a-Library-A-Student/48360 (discussing how the design of a multi-purpose facility
blends educational, intellectual, and social needs on a university campus); Katie Lauren Storey,
Bridging the Gap: Linking Co-Curricular Activities to Student Learning Outcomes in Community
College Students, Dissertation (2010), https://digitalcommons.nl.edu/diss/30 (discussing the im-
provements in student learning outcomes that result from participation in co-curricular activities
and how educational professionals can link co-curricular activities to academic program exper-
iences or courses).
327. See supra notes 231–36 and accompanying text.
328. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); see supra note 37
and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 61–68, 220 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 94–105 and accompanying text; see generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
331. See supra notes 100–04 and accompanying text.
332. Cf. Grutter’s First Amendment, supra note 17, at 572–73.
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time their choices will either reinforce the university’s community stan-
dards (if sufficient participants join the market) or require the university to
revisit its standards (if sufficient participants reject it). If stakeholders judge
a particular university’s standards to lack integrity with institutional obliga-
tions, stakeholder trust, and the university’s reputation, should rightly
suffer.
Universities’ opportunity to continue their meaningful role in defining
and promoting truth for the common good of an increasingly complex soci-
ety depends on their willingness to learn from others and take some risk:
they must renew their vision for the modern university and confidently as-
sert and hold the tension of inclusive diversity and free speech, within
clearly defined confines of truth and the common good, by exercising their
right of constitutional academic freedom. Holding this tension in a way that
has real integrity with their distinctive institution and individual identities
requires more effort than a compromise or imbalance. But without this ef-
fort, stakeholder trust will continue to erode. The better approach is to
double-down on the uniqueness of the university marketplace, with a view
to fully realizing its potential to engage and serve modern students and
society.
